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ABSTRACT
The last quarter century has seen countries across Latin America and other parts of the world dramatically transition from an inquisitorial criminal justice system to an adversarial system. As a
part of this shift in adjudication, these systems have adopted a key
component of the adversarial system: the public defender. But
while the formal and structural changes in these systems have been
profound, the specter of inquisitorialism haunts the public defender organizations and has impeded the progress that reformers had
envisioned.
Largely informed by the United States model, Chile’s public
defender organization, the Defensoría Penal Pública, was designed
to ensure the constitutional right to an attorney in the new adversarial criminal justice system. Although the progress made since
the transition to adversarialism has been remarkable, the role of the
defense lawyer remains undefined and mired in vestiges of the old
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inquisitorial system. The public defender has not yet become the
meaningful counterweight to the state prosecutor that is the theoretical promise of the adversarial system.
This Article examines Chile’s transition from an inquisitorial
system to an adversarial system, with a particular focus on the
public defender and the need for a cultural shift that matches the
structural change. This Article discusses the importance of developing a robust criminal defense culture that transforms the public
defender from an agent of a state bureaucracy to an active and engaged attorney committed to the interests of her client. The dramatic rise in Chile’s incarceration rate since the transition to an adversarial system suggests that a formally adversarial system
without a fully engaged criminal defense system may ultimately be
less protective of defendants’ rights than the old inquisitorial system.
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INTRODUCTION

The last quarter century has seen the institution of the American-style public defender spread throughout Latin America and
many other parts of the world even as the existing system of indigent criminal defense in the United States has undergone withering criticism.2 While academics, practitioners, and the popular
press have rightly pointed out the shortcomings of public defender
systems throughout the United States, these same systems have
served as models for countries transitioning their criminal justice
systems from an inquisitorial to an adversarial approach. It could
be that the American-style public defender system, to paraphrase
Winston Churchill, is the worst way to protect the rights of the indigent accused—except for all of the other systems that have been
tried.3 But as countries around the world continue to transition
toward oral and adversarial systems of criminal adjudication, the
pitfalls, limitations, and occasional successes of American public
defender institutions should provide both caution and guidance
for the next generation of criminal justice reformers in those countries.
Nowhere have the structural changes to the criminal justice
system been more pronounced than in Chile over the past twentyfive years. The 1988 plebiscite ending the Pinochet dictatorship
and allowing for the restoration of democratic government ushered in a new movement to modernize and reform many aspects of
the Chilean judicial system.4 Chile undertook a radical overhaul of
2 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in
the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 894–901 (2013) (explaining that the federal right to adequate counsel has not come to fruition due to a
lack of resources, incompetent attorneys, and rising crime rates); Cara H. Drinan,
The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent
Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 487 (2010) (proposing legislation that
gives a cause of action to criminal defendants based on the chronic inadequacies
of the public defense system); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1031–34 (2006)
(providing anecdotal and statistical data of people who wrongfully suffer in the
criminal justice system due to the unavailability of adequate counsel).
3 Winston Churchill, Speech at House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947) (“Many
forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and
woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been
said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms
that have been tried from time to time.”).
4 Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial v. Inquisitorial Systems: The
Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J.L & TRADE
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its criminal justice system in a relatively short period of time. This
transformation utilized meaningful input from academics and
lawyers within Chile and from other Latin American countries, Europe, and the United States.5 These reforms were just one aspect of
the broader movement toward the restoration of democracy in
Chile. One aspect of the Chilean reforms that has received relatively little attention is its creation of a public defender system, the design of which was heavily influenced by similar institutions in the
United States.6
The move from a written, inquisitorial system to an oral, adversarial system within Chile mirrored similar projects throughout
Latin America in the last two decades of the twentieth century.7
After two centuries of strictly inquisitorial criminal justice, the
breadth and pace of the change toward adversarialism was breathtaking.8 Although the reforms differed slightly from country to
country in Latin America, all of the reforms shared certain attributes: a move toward oral and public trials, a profound strengthening of the role of the prosecutor, and the displacement of the power
to conduct pretrial investigations and make charging decisions
from the judge to the prosecutor. Generally, all of the reforms
throughout Latin America augmented the procedural rights of the
accused at every stage of the process and introduced concepts of
plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion. To greatly varying
degrees, each of the reforms institutionalized the role of the victim
as an actor within the adjudication process for the first time.9
Chile’s new system of adjudication called for the creation of a
AM. 323, 324 (1998) (describing the start of Chilean judicial reforms); Cristian Riego, Oral Procedures and Case Management: The Innovations of Chile’s Reform, 14 SW.
J.L. TRADE AM. 339, 339 (2008) (explaining that the origins of judicial reform grew
out of Chile’s transition to democracy).
5 Maximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of
Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 656 n.212 (2007) [hereinafter
Langer, Revolution]; see also Riego, Oral Procedures, supra note 4, at 343 (explaining
that modifications in the Criminal Procedure Code changed as reform groups increased contact with Anglo-Saxon systems and particularly with the systems of
the United States and United Kingdom).
6 Cousino, supra note 4, at 350–51 (advocating for a Chilean public defender
system based on the strengths and weaknesses of the system in the United States).
7 See Langer, Revolution supra note 5, at 631 (detailing adoption of accusatorial
criminal codes in Latin American countries between 1991 and 2006).
8 See id. at 618–31 (noting that fourteen Latin American countries adopted
adversarial systems within a period of fifteen years).
9 See id. at 618–19 (“Changes include . . . expanding the victim’s role and protection during the criminal process.”).
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new institution: the public defender. Although the pre-reform inquisitorial systems of adjudication provided some formal representation for those accused of crime, the move toward oral, adversarial proceedings and the restructuring of the focus of these
adjudicative systems demanded a more meaningful advocate for
the accused. To this end, Chile created the Defensoría Penal Pública, a national public defender agency to protect the rights of the accused within the new system.
The very idea of the criminal defense attorney has shifted profoundly as the country has moved from its inquisitorial system to
an adversarial one. Defenders have been required, at least in theory, to wholly redefine their roles, professional self-conceptions, and
relationships with the state, the system, and their clients. The radical change in structure and substance of the work of public defenders demands an equally radical shift in the culture of the profession. As important as the changes to the formal architecture of
the criminal adjudication system are, meaningful progress also requires redefinition of the culture and self-conception of the public
defender. The Chilean experience demonstrates that these cultural
changes can be the most difficult to effect. The data showing a
dramatic rise in incarceration in Chile after the adoption of the adversarial system suggest that a formal change in the structure of
adjudication is of limited value in meaningfully protecting the interests of those involved in the criminal justice system. As countries across Latin America and other parts of the world continue
the transition toward adversarialism, they would do well to focus
on the cultural aspects of criminal defense lawyering as well as the
formal and structural changes that the new systems require.
In Part 2, this Article examines the regional shift from inquisitorialism to adversarialism in criminal procedure throughout Latin
America in the last two decades of the twentieth century and discusses the historical and philosophical reasons for such a profound
and nearly universal transition during that period. Part 3 more
closely evaluates the structural changes in Chile that were debated
and discussed during the 1990s and phased in during the first few
years of the twenty-first century. Part 4 discusses the role of the
public defender in the newly adversarial system and some of the
challenges that persist after more than a decade of structural adversarialism. Finally, Part 5 proposes specific reforms to refine and
develop the mission of Chile’s public defenders to improve their
role as a meaningful part of a new system of justice, and argues
that a shift in public defender culture is necessary to ensure that
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Chile’s ambitious reforms accomplish their intended goals.
2.

SHIFT FROM INQUISITORIALISM TO ADVERSARIALISM
THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA

The transition in adjudication systems from inquisitorial to adversarial in Latin America began in the last two decades of the
twentieth century.10 This theoretical and practical shift in the way
countries conceived of and carried out their criminal justice systems had several elements common to the countries of Latin America but several notable differences as well. Generally, each shared
the objective of transforming criminal trials both into oral, rather
than written affairs, and adversarial (or accusatorial) contests, rather than inquisitorial events.11 To accomplish this, each country
undertook a radical transformation from a judge-centric system to
a party-centric system.12 The most profound change in this transition was the general displacement of the power to investigate and
bring criminal charges from the judiciary to the prosecution.13
The inquisitorial system, which evolved from church methods
of resolving disputes, treats the adjudication of criminal disputes
as fundamentally a public and bureaucratic endeavor, rather than a
private matter.14 In an inquisitorial system, “evidence is gathered
10 See Mauricio Duce, Reforma de la justicia penal en América Latina: Una perspectiva panorámica y comparada, examinando su desarrollo, contenidos y desafíos, Serie de
Políticas Públicas UDP Documentos de Trabajo #3, at 5 (2009) (explaining that
Latin American reforms generally began in the 1980s and continued into the early
2000s); Cousino, supra note 4, at 324 (noting that reforms in Chile began in the
1990s).
11 Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for the Underprivileged?, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN
AMERICA 255, 255–56 (Juan E. Mendez et al., eds. 1999) (“[A] number of [Latin
American] countries . . . are making efforts to change their criminal procedures
into a more oral and less inquisitorial model[.]”).
12 See generally Langer, Revolution, supra note 5 at 618–19 (“As such, the reforms share many characteristics, including the introduction of oral, public trials;
the introduction and/or strengthening of the office of the prosecutor; and the decision to put the prosecutor instead of the judge in charge of pretrial investigation”).
13 Cousino, supra note 4, at 332 (explaining that the prosecutor’s new role is
to act as the owner of the public criminal action and as the manager of the investigation).
14 See Langer, supra note 5, Revolution at 628–30 (discussing the origins and
operation of the inquisitorial system).
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by judges or judge-like investigators, public officers who operate
under a duty to seek the truth,”15 the role of the judge is dominant,
and the parties and their lawyers play a greatly reduced part in the
process. By contrast, an adversarial system is party-driven and
centers on the idea that well-motivated and similarly-resourced
parties operating within a procedurally fair system is a more effective, accurate, and just way of resolving disputes.16
The two systems, however, constitute much more than distinct
decision-making strategies or ways of structuring trials. They embody two entirely different cultures of understanding disputes and
negotiating the relationship between the State and its citizens. As
Máximo Langer has described the difference:
[w]hereas the adversarial system conceives criminal procedure as governing a dispute between two parties (prosecution and defense) before a passive decision-maker (the
judge and/or the jury), the inquisitorial system conceives
criminal procedure as an official investigation, done by one
or more impartial officials of the state, in order to determine
the truth.17
This profound distinction in how disputes are to be resolved
has cultural implications much deeper than the merely structural
15 JOHN LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 1 (Oxford University Press 2003); see also James Cooper, Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform: The Battle of Chile, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 501, 519 n.96 (“[T]he inquisitorial criminal process is conducted by an investigating judge who discovers the trust
concerning a crime and then sentences the defendant.”).
16 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 14 AM. BAR. ASS’N 445, 447 (1906).

The sporting theory of justice . . . is so rooted in the profession in America that most of us take it for a fundamental legal tenet . . . Hence in
America we take it as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere
umpire, to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the
game, and that the parties should fight out their own game in their own
way without judicial interference. We resent such interference as unfair,
even when in the interests of justice.
See also Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1, 10 (1975) (“[T]he adversary system only works if each party to the controversy has a lawyer, a person whose institutional role it is to argue, plead and present the merits of his or her case and the demerits of the opponent’s.”).
17 Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2004) [hereinafter Langer, Legal Transplants]. As a shorthand, Langer refers to the adversarial system as the “model of the dispute” and the inquisitorial system as the “model of the official investigation.” Id. at 20.
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differences in trial procedure.
The shared inheritance of the colonial Spanish judicial tradition
lasted without significant challenge until almost the end of the
twentieth century.18 As Latin American states gained their independence in the first years of the nineteenth century, European
states had already begun to reform their inquisitorial systems of
criminal adjudication.19 Unrest and public sentiment had caused
many of the European countries to modify their strictly inquisitorial systems to better account for evolving conceptions of fairness
and individual rights.20 Each newly independent Latin American
state had to decide for itself whether to maintain the strict inquisitorial model that Spain had used or to adopt a reformed model, as
France had recently implemented. In France, Napoleon’s Code
d’Instruction Criminelle had moved that country away from a strictly inquisitorial system and had introduced reforms from the English system of criminal adjudication.21
The leaders of the newly independent Latin American states,
however, rejected the more moderate hybrid systems of Europe in
favor of a more strictly inquisitorial system.22 Although the hybrid
French system was well-known to the Latin American governing
class, the newly independent Latin American countries roundly rejected such reforms. According to Máximo Langer,
Latin American elites rejected the more liberal codes mainly
because they deeply distrusted and disliked the jury as well
as oral and public trials, believing that their populations
were not ready for them. Instead, the criminal procedures
that the young, independent Latin American republics
adopted generally followed the inquisitorial model (created
by the Catholic Church and absolutist monarchies) that had
See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 128 (Stanford University Press 2nd ed. 1985) (describing criminal procedure reforms at the end of the
eighteenth century, including the jury trial, oral procedures, the right to counsel,
limits on the inquisitorial powers, and other steps towards an oral and public system).
19 Langer, Revolution, supra note 5, at 627.
20 MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION, supra note 18.
21 Langer, Revolution, supra note 5, at 627. The code adopted in France under
Napoleon maintained the secret written pretrial investigation, but introduced the
right to an oral, public trial before a jury. Id.
22 See id at 628 (noting that Latin American countries rejected European criminal reforms despite avocation by political actors).
18

THE
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prevailed in continental Europe and the Portuguese and
Spanish Americas between the 13th and 19th centuries.23
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although every Latin American country tinkered with its criminal adjudication system, none altered the basic inquisitorial structure of
the system.24 In the middle of the twentieth century, issues of
criminal justice and judicial reform were not on the minds of many
in Latin America. Such issues were generally seen as insignificant
in comparison to the broader political struggles taking place
throughout the continent in the context of Cold War politics.25
Those on the political right saw a more efficient, fair, and meaningful judicial system as a potential threat to the status quo, and those
on the political left saw “issues of individual justice” as meaningless when compared with broader issues of structural power imbalances.26 As a result, criminal justice reform in Latin America
failed to gain any real momentum until the late twentieth century.
This began to change very quickly, however, during the 1980s.
As countries throughout Latin America began to emerge from au23 Id. Scholars have also advanced alternate theories to explain the lack of
reform upon independence. For instance, some assert that, unlike the American
and French wars of independence that took place a few decades earlier, the Latin
American wars for independence generally lacked a conscious or “deliberate
agenda for social and political change.” Felipe Saez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial
Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV.
1267, 1282 (1998). Although the independence movements in Latin America
might have been “imbued with ideological overtones” from those earlier political
movements, Saez Garcia argues that Latin American independence movements
stemmed more from the collapse of the Bourbon dynasty in the first years of the
nineteenth century. Id. Because of this political history, the newly formed governments of Latin America did not alter in any fundamental or radical way the
structure of the judicial systems that had been inherited from the Spanish.

No revalorization of the individual vis-à-vis the State took place, there
was no development of effective checks and balances among the branches of government, and popular participation in the political decisionmaking and judicial processes was not encouraged. Instead, after achieving independence, Latin American countries maintained the authoritarian institutional structure of colonial times.
Id. at 1282–83.
24 See Langer, Revolution supra note 5, at 630–31 (noting that Latin American
countries had inquisitorial systems and ultimately adopted adversarial changes in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century).
25 Id. at 644 n.140 (“U.S. national security doctrine during the Cold War established containment and elimination of communist influence as a priority for Latin
America.”).
26 Sutil, supra note 11, at 258.
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thoritarian governments and outright dictatorships, newly democratic governments and citizens began to question the failures of
the judiciary during these periods. Virtually every Latin American
country began making radical shifts in the philosophical underpinnings of their systems and fundamental changes in the way
criminal cases were adjudicated.27
The rhetoric of human rights norms played a powerful role in
the fight against dictatorship. As countries transitioned to democracy, government institutions centered their focus on human
rights. Reformers began to concentrate on the need for criminal
justice systems that complied with international human rights
norms and used this argument to reshape systems throughout the
region.28 Criminal adjudication processes became a natural target
as Latin American countries emerged from years of dictatorship
and repressive authoritarian governments. These institutions had
not only failed to prevent human rights abuses but had been affirmatively used by the old governments both to suppress dissent,
and to avoid culpability for human rights abuses.29 The ineffectual,
bureaucratic, and secretive court systems “became a metaphor for
the dictatorships.”30 Many saw a move to oral, transparent, and
adversarial proceedings as a necessary antidote to the failures of
the old system. Indeed, the inability of the judicial systems to respond in any meaningful way to the abuses of dictatorships during
the 1970s and 1980s was understood as an indictment not just of
those specific national systems but of the inquisitorial approach
more generally.31 A focus on human rights and due process was
27 See Langer, Revolution supra note 5, at 631 (noting the breadth of the change
from inquisitorial to adversarial). The first countries to adopt new adversarial
codes of criminal procedure were Argentina in 1991 (for its federal courts only)
and Guatemala in 1992. Id. at 646; see also Steven E. Hendrix, Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Guatemala’s Conversion to the Adversarial System, 5
SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 365, 365 (1998) (explaining that Guatemala started to overhaul its procedure codes in 1994 in response to concerns about favoritism, corruption, and security).
28 See Duce, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that “[a]fter a period characterized by
massive [regional] human rights violations, the new democratic governments reacted by adopting policies to improve institutional mechanisms for their protection”).
29 See Cooper, supra note 15, at 519 n. 95 (noting that reforms were aimed at
ending human rights violations and restraining the violators).
30 Id..
31 One observer compared the Latin American inquisitorial judicial systems
with those of pre-Revolution France, noting that the systems “provided government officials and police with the authority to combat unruly crowds, political
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seen as a necessary component of any future criminal adjudication
system.32
At the same time that those on the political left saw reform as a
progressive response to the human rights abuses of the past, those
on the political right supported reform both as a solution to the
perceived problem of rising crime and as a means of “liberalizing”
or “modernizing” the economies of Latin American countries.33
The World Bank and other institutions began promoting judicial
reform throughout Latin America as a means to advance freemarket ideology and institutions. This neo-liberal position was
expressed at the time by an employee of the World Bank:
Acknowledgement of the need for judicial reform is growprotests, and, later, union organization and strikes without recourse to regimes of
exception.” See Cooper, supra note 15, at 519 n.97 (quoting BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION OF TYRANNY: REGIMES OF EXCEPTION IN SPANISH AMERICA 347 (2003)).
Just as public sentiment in late eighteenth century Europe forced reforms in the
inquisitorial system during the revolutions in Europe of that era, public opinion in
late twentieth century Latin America also forced those countries to abandon inquisitorialism. MERRYMAN, supra note 18, at 128. One scholar captures the deeper
cultural meanings of the terms “inquisitorial” and “adversarial:”
[T]he expressions ‘adversarial’ (or ‘accusatorial’) and ‘inquisitorial’ are
fraught with political and cultural connotations; for instance, the adversarial tradition is usually linked to liberal or democratic conceptions
while the inquisitorial tradition is linked to authoritarian conceptions of
criminal procedure. This has led to what could be described as a rhetorical struggle for the appropriation of these terms…[A]s a consequence of
these connotations, ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ have been central
terms or ‘floating signifiers’ through which the actors of the AngloAmerican and the civil law systems have defined and differentiated their
own identity, both from the identity of their traditions as well as from
their own past.
Langer, Legal Transplants, supra note 17, at 18–19.
32 See Langer, supra note 5, at 632 (describing “the increasing recognition of
human rights beginning in the 1970s, [which] contributed to the perception
among domestic actors that due process standards were too low”).
33 See Cooper, supra note 15, at 516–17 (quoting Joseph Stiglitz as stating “The
market system requires clearly established property rights and the courts to enforce them; but often these are absent in developing countries”). The economic
argument for court reform explains the vast resources that countries spend in attempts to export their legal cultures and institutions. Using the example of Chile,
James Cooper describes this interesting jockeying for influence among international actors, primarily Germany and the United States on the judicial reform process. Id. See also Jonathan L. Hafetz, Pretrial Detention, Human Rights, and Judicial
Reform in Latin America, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1754, 1761 (2003) (arguing that the
Latin American reforms “grew out of two different impulses: the reaction to the
human rights abuses of the 1970s and 1980s, and the desire to increase the efficiency of the judicial sector”).
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ing because of increasing recognition that political and judicial reform are key corollaries of economic reform. A free
and robust market can thrive only in a political system
where individual freedoms and property rights are accorded respect and where redress for violations of such rights
can be found in fair and equitable courts.34
The United States and European governments also provided
incentives to court reform by making it a prerequisite to joining
trade alliances like Mercosur, NAFTA, and the World Trade Organization.35
As democratically-elected governments replaced authoritarian
regimes throughout Latin America, rates of reported criminal activity and feelings of crime-related insecurity grew throughout the
region.36 In Chile, between 1985 and 2001, the homicide rate for
34 Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience of Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 167, 168 (1995).
35 See id. at 169 (explaining that membership in international trade organizations carries a commensurate responsibility to “pursue harmonization of laws”).
Efforts of organizations like the World Bank, USAID, and the Inter-American Development Bank to implement judicial reform throughout Latin America began in
the 1980s and were primarily economic in objective. See Hafetz, Pretrial Detention,
supra note 33, at 1754–55 (stating that “[t]he principal motive of this movement is
economic – that promoting good government and the rule of law will make the
region’s legal systems more market-friendly and create the necessary conditions
for economic development in today’s global economy.”); see also Joseph H. Thome,
Heading South but Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in Latin America, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 691, 697 (2000), stating:

In the view of the [World] Bank, the Latin American judiciary had become an impediment to [its goals of creating a legal environment conducive and friendly to foreign investment] due to its inefficiency, characterized by lengthy case delays, limited access to justice, a lack of
transparency and predictability, and poor public confidence in the system.
Describing the reforms to Chile’s criminal justice system as far more broadly significant than in just the criminal context, Chilean President Eduardo Frei called
the reforms “a critical step in the process of development, economic growth, and
the modernization of the State.” See Mauricio Duce, La Reforma Procesal Penal
Chilena: Gestación y Estado de Avance de un Proceso de Transformación en Marcha, in
EN BUSCA DE UNA JUSTICIA DISTINTA: EXPERIENCIAS DE REFORMA EN AMÉRICA LATINA
195, 199 (Pásara, Luis ed., 2004), http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/4/
1509/7.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5Z3-82P5] (quoting President Frei as stating “[L]a
reforma no sólo se justifica por la necesidad de adaptar la legislación chilena a los
estándares básicos del debido proceso, sino también como un paso indispensable
en el proceso de desarrollo, el crecimiento económico y la modernización del Estado”) (translation by the author).
36 See generally CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, AND THE CHALLENGE TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA (Marcelo Bergman & Laurence Whitehead eds.,
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males increased by 72% and the homicide rate for young males increased by 178%.37 The capital city, Santiago, experienced a 49%
increase in reported property crimes between 1999 and 2001.38
Many believed that the increase in crime threatened the newlyformed democratic governments and could provide a pretext for a
return to authoritarianism if not addressed.39 The erosion of public
confidence in state institutions that accompany rising feelings of
insecurity may weaken support for nascent human rights standards and “may even allow authoritarian practices to return under
the guise of mano dura policies purporting to correct weaknesses in
the democratic approach to crime control.”40
Along with the rising levels of both reported and perceived
criminal activity throughout Latin America came high levels of
mistrust in police, government, and the criminal justice system
generally. By these measures, Chilean state institutions demonstrated greatly varying levels of success when compared to other
Latin American countries but still showed a general lack of faith in
judicial systems.41 Although Chilean citizens regard the police rel2009). Some argue that Chileans, like people in other countries, have a feeling of
insecurity and rising criminality that is exaggerated and inaccurate. See Lucia
Dammert, Citizen In(Security) in Chile, 1980–2007, in CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY,
AND THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 36, at 47. See also
id. at 55 (comparing surveys and crime statistics and concluding “that levels of
citizen fear are higher than actual levels of victimization or the magnitude of criminal activity”). Dammert points out that, although Chile has traditionally had a
low crime rate compared to its regional neighbors, around the year 2000, reports
of crime began to increase in Chile and the population experienced a collective
increase in the sense of insecurity. Id. at 47–54.
37 See Marcelo Bergman & Laurence Whitehead, Introduction: Criminality and
Citizen Security in Latin America, in CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, AND THE
CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 36, at 1, 5 & tbl. I.1 (citing
data from the World Health Organization Mortality Database, WHO 2005).
38 See id. at 6 & tbl. I.2 (citing data from the Santiago Ministerio del Interior).
39 See id. at 1–2. (discussing the increase in crime in Chile)
40 Id. at 1–2. Indeed, in 1992, both Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chavez
in Venezuela alleged that the inability of the judicial systems of their respective
countries to deal with corruption and rising crime resulted in a lack of legitimacy
and made necessary the suspension of regular systems of government. See Jorge
Correa Sutil, Access to Justice and Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Any Hope of
Equality? 6 (Sela 1999, Equality, Panel 6: Equality in Administration of Justice, La
Serena, Chile, Working Paper, 1999) (describing Chavez’s thwarted coup in Venezuela and Fujimori’s decision to interfere with the constitutional function of other
branches of the Peruvian government).
41 In a series of 2003 Latinobarometro surveys measuring citizen trust in the
police, fewer Chileans indicated mistrust in the police than in almost any other
Latin American country surveyed. 51% of Chileans surveyed responded that they
had “little or no trust” in the police. Only Uruguay had a lower level of mistrust

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/2

2017]

PUBLIC DEFENDER AS INTERNATIONAL TRANSPLANT

845

atively favorably,42 the criminal justice system in general fared
much more poorly in public opinion surveys. When asked in 2003
whether or not they agreed with the statement, “The judicial system punishes delinquents,” 69% of Chilean respondents expressed
their disagreement. In contrast to the comparatively high levels of
trust in the police, the expressed lack of confidence among Chileans in the judicial system was higher than in all but three other Latin American countries included in the survey.43 Clearly in 2003,
prior to the full implementation of the criminal procedure reforms,
Chilean citizens perceived that the state institutions responsible for
adjudicating and punishing criminals were not functioning well.
Both the perception and reality of rising crime rates and a system
that seemed unable to respond contributed to a momentum for the
creation of a more efficient criminal justice system.44
in the police, at 49%, and the other fifteen countries included in the survey measured higher levels of citizen mistrust of the police. In Bolivia, mistrust is as high
as 84%. Bergman, in CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, supra note 36, at 7 & tbl.13.
42 A 2003 survey of 18 Latin American countries found that only 29% of respondents had much or some confidence in the police and only 20% had much or
some confidence in the judicial system. See Hugo Fruhling, Public Opinion and the
Police in Chile, in CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, supra note 36, at 119, 124 (citing
the 2003 Latinobarometro survey). Looking specifically at Chile, Fruhling also
concluded that levels of support for the police at that time were much higher than
levels of support for the courts or for the criminal justice system generally. See id.
at 120 (noting that despite an increase in Chile’s crime rate, levels of support for
the police was higher than other criminal justice institutions). Fruhling attributes
this comparatively high level of support to recent cultural phenomena: “[b]ecause
Chile was characterized by political polarization and conflict from the 1960s
through the 1980s, Chileans now place a high value on stability and the rule of
law.” Id. at 130; see also Dammert, supra note 36, at 58 (citing surveys available at
www.cep.cl).
43 Id. at 7, tbl.13.
44 See Langer, supra note 5, at 632–33 (explaining the various motivations for
the Latin American reforms); see also Sutil, Access to Justice, supra note 40, at 6 (describing the “curious alliance” in support of reform between left and right and the
tension that has sometimes resulted from these strange bedfellows). On the point
of the reform’s relationship to increased repressiveness and a growing prison
population, see Riego, supra note 4, at 355 (citing Javiera Diaz, Sistema Carcelario, la
función punitiva en un estado de derecho, CRÓNICA DIGITAL, Oct. 6, 2005, http://
www.cronicadigital.cl/2005/10/06/cronica-2005-p1851/ [https://perma.cc/277V
-XEBE] (last visited Feb. 4, 2017)). See also Part 4.3, infra (discussing how a conceptual and real tension between the market orientation and rights orientation has
always driven the reforms in Latin America). With the end of the Cold War,
many believed that judicial reform could simultaneously satisfy both orientations.
But this apparent harmony of interests, goals, and means may mask conceptual vagueness as well as tensions and contradictions between global
and national goals and policies…[For example], a majority population
facing rising criminality may use democratic means to push for stricter
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For these reasons, reform to the criminal justice system was
seen as welcome and necessary by both the left and the right.45 The
left envisioned a more robust system of procedural safeguards for
those accused of crime and the right looked forward to a more
modern and efficient way of adjudicating crime, a result that
would put Chile in good standing with international bodies and
also deal with the increase in criminal activity that had accompanied the transition to democracy.46 The broad ideological consensus presented obvious political benefits and led to great momentum leading to the passage of the reform.47 Proponents of criminal
justice reform consciously appealed to both sides of the political
spectrum, arguing that the reforms would increase regard for human rights and would also deal with perceptions of rising criminality as the country continued its transition away from dictatorship.48 In a political environment in which right-wing political
parties used perceptions of security problems and rising criminality against the governing center-left coalition government, proponents of reform “diminish[ed] the political differences surrounding
this type of project by limiting the debate to the logic of efficiency
of the justice system.”49
and more efficient law enforcement, even at the expense of the human
rights of those suspected of criminal activity.
Thome, Heading South but Looking North, supra note 35, at 692–93.
45 See Claudio Pavlic Véliz, Criminal Procedure Reform: A New Form of Criminal
Justice for Chile, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1363, 1364–65 (2012) (stating:
[t]he motives that drove the reforms had the virtue of providing good
arguments for the entire political spectrum to be able to agree to support
the criminal justice reforms: some in order to improve the country’s economic integration into a globalized world, and others to improve the
laws protecting constitutional and legal rights, strengthening respect for
human beings and their rights).
46 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 326 (stating that “the criminal procedure reform found a common ground between two issues. First the foundational spirit of
democracy and improving human rights standards, and second, coming mostly
from the now opposition, the idea of public safety and the need for efficiency in
the criminal system”).
47 See id. at 327 (noting the “broad consensus” that accompanied the reforms).
48 See Rafael Blanco, Richard Hutt, & Hugo Rojas, Reform to the Criminal Justice System in Chile: Evaluation and Challenges, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L. L. REV. 253, 265–
66 (2005) (explaining a history of the strategic and political alliances that led to the
passage of the reform bill in Chile).
49 Daniel Palacios Muñoz, Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile: New Agents and
the Restructuring of a Field, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION 112, 120–21 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, eds., Routledge
2012).
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This dualism in those promoting reform may have resulted in
some of the critiques of the new system as overly punitive and
leading to excessively high rates of incarceration and involvement
in the criminal justice system.50 It is likely that the focus on achieving and maintaining consensus for strategic electoral purposes
blurred the objectives of the reform proposals. Without a more
precise delineation of what its primary purpose was, the reform set
out to serve two masters and, as a result, failed to fully achieve either of its purposes.51
3.

A RADICALLY NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR CHILE

Chile’s reformation of its criminal justice system was unique in
several ways. Because of the duration of the Pinochet dictatorship,
Chile was one of the last Latin American countries to begin the
transition to an adversarial system and therefore was able to learn
from the experiences of other countries in the region. Having seen
other countries fail to eradicate the perceived shortcomings of the
inquisitorial system and to allow aspects of inquisitorialism to
creep into a system that was formally adversarial, Chile’s reforms
were more profound than its neighbors and its new system more
extreme in its embrace of adversarialism.52 During the 1990s, Chilean academics, judges, and legal practitioners had the opportunity
to think entirely anew about what the roles of the various actors in
the criminal justice system should be and how they should interact,
to draw on the successes and challenges of other criminal justice
systems, and to implement the new structural reforms wholeheartedly. Ultimately, the Chilean reforms borrowed most heavily from
the Anglo-American system and ended up importing the model of
the public defender largely from the U.S. conception. As described
below, however, reformers in Chile focused much less on the de50 See infra, Part 4.3 (discussing how the public defender may play a role in
mass incarceration).
51 On this subject, it is worth noting that the right adopted the theme of rising
crime as one of its “battle horses” in criticizing the center-left Concertación government leading up to the 1989 elections. Duce, supra note 35, at 220. One wonders if an embrace of “efficiency” and “adversarialism” in the Chilean system will
lead ultimately to a “tough-on-crime” orientation and high rates of incarceration.
52 See Riego, supra note 4, at 346 (explaining that although Chile’s new system
“maintain[s] several elements of the Continental European tradition,” it is a
“much more adversarial model” than other Latin American systems).
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sign and objectives of the defense lawyer’s role in the new system
as compared with the new prosecutorial and judicial roles.53
The structural changes in Chile’s criminal justice system could
not have been more profound. They are correctly described by observers as “radical,”54 a “revolutionary change”55 and “a complete
paradigm shift.”56 Beyond simply a reallocation of power within
an existing system, the changes in structure require an entirely different understanding of what it means to adjudicate criminality, “a
new cultural vision of the criminal justice system.”57
Discussions of criminal justice reform began in Chile almost
immediately upon the end of the Pinochet dictatorship. Chilean
intellectuals, government officials, and the public quickly reached
a consensus on the need for radical reform. As described more
generally in Part 2, above, “[t]here was widespread dissatisfaction
with the passivity of the judiciary during the dictatorship when
there was absolutely no protection for the most basic of human
rights.”58 A prominent reformer explained that, by the end of the
Pinochet dictatorship, the Chilean criminal justice system “was
considered obsolete and contrary to individuals’ basic human
rights.”59 Chilean President Ricardo Lagos illustrated this view in
his 1995 speech to Congress upon presenting the initial judicial reform bill:
The most important political change in Chile has been the
strengthening of the democratic model, which posits respect for human rights as a fundamental principle of legitimacy. Both phenomena present growing demands on the
53 See Part 4.1, infra (discussing how public defenders lack a clear mission and
what impact the lack of a clear mission has on the criminal justice system).
54 See id. at 339.
55 Cousino, supra note 4, at 327.
56 Blanco et al., supra note 48, at 253.
57 Id. at 266. Blanco and others also predict that the reforms “will produce
significant change both institutionally and culturally.” Id. at 254. Mauricio Duce
describes the reforms as a reconceptualization of the relationship between the
state and its people, and a democratization of the state. See Duce, supra note 35, at
195 (stating that “no sólo constituyen un trabajo técnico de mejoramiento y modernización del sistema de administración de justicia, sino que se enmarcan en un
proceso mayor: el de reconfiguración, modernización, y democratización del Estado.”).
58 Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 254 & n.4 (citing INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN
NACIONAL SOBRE VERDAD, JUSTICIA Y RECONCILIACIÓN (2001)).
59 Riego, supra note 4, at 339.
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justice administration system, making it necessary to modernize it, about which an important consensus in the country has developed…The political changes, for their part, require a justice system that is accessible, impartial,
egalitarian and maximizes guarantees. The need to prevent
corruption presupposes the active participation of citizens
in the oversight of power and that increases the need for an
efficient and independent Judicial Branch…60
Chile’s first democratic president after the Pinochet dictatorship “was emphatic in criticism of the Judiciary, and in particular
of the Supreme Court” because of the Court’s failure to stop the
human rights abuses of the former regime.61 The Rettig Report,
produced by Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, was intended to document human rights abuses that occurred during Pinochet’s military dictatorship.62 The Rettig Report
was harsh and blunt in its denunciation of the judiciary’s performance during the Pinochet years.63 Because of the acquiescence or
Id. at 339 n.1.
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES 475 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). On the judiciary’s acquiescence in the dictatorship, see also the Rettig Report, which is reproduced in part at TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 467.
62 The Commission was in operation from May 1990 until February 1991,
when it released the Rettig Report. See Truth Commission: Chile 90, U.S. INST. OF
PEACE, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-chile-90 [https://
perma.cc/JB3Y-LCFM] (last visited Dec. 13, 2015). The entire report is available
from the U.S. Institute of Peace.
63 As the Rettig Report put it:
60
61

The Judicial Power was the only one of the three Powers of State that
continued functioning without being intervened or dissolved…Interest
in maintaining a structure or image of legality, on the new military authorities’ part, made them especially careful with members of the judiciary. . . . This would have permitted the Judicial Power to assume a more
resolute attitude in defense of the human rights that were being violated.
However, and although jurisdictional activities continued functioning
normally in almost all areas of national concern whose conflicts arrived
at the courts, in the area of human rights violated by agents of authority
in a magnitude unknown before, jurisdictional oversight was notoriously
insufficient…
The attitude adopted during the military regime by the Judicial Power
produced, to an important and involuntary extent, an aggravation of the
process of systematic violations of human rights, both in the short term –
in not lending protection to detainees in denounced cases – and insofar
as it offered repressive agents an increasing certainty of impunity for
their criminal actions, whatever form of aggression might be employed.
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outright support that members of the judiciary had shown for the
Pinochet regime, the judicial system generally was held in very
low esteem by Chilean citizens as the country transitioned back to
democracy.64
Prior to the 2000 reforms, Chilean criminal procedure had been
governed by the 1906 Código de Procedimiento Penal65 (“CPP”),
which had codified much of the inquisitorial system that Chile had
adopted from Spain during colonial times and maintained after
Rettig Report, vol. I, ch. IV, A & B.1(b.3), reprinted in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra
note 61, at 467. Unsurprisingly, one of the recommendations of the Rettig Report
was reforming and ensuring the future independence of the judiciary. See also
Edmundo Fuenzalida Faivovich, Law and Legal Culture in Chile, 1974–1999, in
LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE
108, 116 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo eds., 2003)
In brief, the superior courts, as components of the legal system, did not
perform their role and allowed the military government to pursue a policy of elimination of the opposition. As a large number of citizens disappeared or were exiled, the majority of judges and judicial functionaries
did not raise their voices in protest. They could not have done much
more, given the concentration of power in the hands of the military, but
this gesture would have been important for the internal and external legal culture: a change from a historical attitude of respect toward the superior courts to a vision increasingly more critical of their behavior.
64 See, e.g., Human Rights and the “Politics of Agreements”: Chile During President
Aylwin’s First Year, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1991), reprinted in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 61. One example of the attitude of the judiciary toward the
widespread human rights abuses of the early years of the dictatorship is shown in
a 1975 speech given by the Chief Justice of the Chilean Supreme Court:

[T]he Appellate Court in Santiago and the Supreme Court had both been
pestered in their work by the numerous habeas corpus presented to
them, on the pretexts of arrests ordered by the Executive. This has disrupted the work of the Courts, interfering with their duty to occupy
themselves on the urgent matters of their jurisdiction.
Jorge C. Sutil, Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chilean Case After Dictatorship, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1464 & n. 41 (1992) (quoting the Chief Justice’s speech). In 1996, the National Corporation for Reconciliation and Reparation
concluded that 3,197 people had died or disappeared during the Pinochet regime.
1,102 were identified as disappearances and 2,095 as deaths. Pinochet’s Chile,
WASH. POST (2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/
pinochet/overview.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2015) [https://perma.cc/Q472B7NW]. For more detailed information regarding the human rights violations in
Chile, see generally REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION (“Rettig Report”) (Feb. 1991), http://www.usip.org/sites/
default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-Report/Chile90Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZU6-F3CG] (explaining “the rationale and effects
of the Aylwin administration’s overall human rights policy”).
65 Law No. 1853, Febrero 13, 1906, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/cl/cl022es.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/J2YT-PA3Q].
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achieving its independence.66 Amendments to the Chilean Constitution in 1980 left the specifics of the 1906 CPP unchanged but
purported to give additional protections to criminal defendants.67
These constitutional provisions proved ineffective in altering criminal procedures in any meaningful way.68
After his election in 1989, Chilean President Patricio Aylwin
proposed a series of procedural changes in the criminal adjudication system, some (but not all) of which were passed. The Leyes
Cumplidos of 1991 provided for strict time limits on how long a
defendant could be held before seeing a judge and before being arraigned, prompt access to counsel, and the right to be free from torture.69 Although much more modest than the package of reforms
that would come a decade later, Aylwin’s reforms to these aspects
of criminal procedure set the stage for the more radical overhaul to
follow.
In spite of the 1991 legal reforms, much remained unchanged in
the criminal courts, with defendants still unable to secure either
counsel or prompt hearings.70 Article 19(3) of the Constitution had
guaranteed the right to an attorney since 1980,71 but even on the
eve of the reforms, many of those accused of serious crimes were
being represented, if at all, by law students.72 One central criticism
was the duration of even simple criminal matters and the widespread use and abuse of pretrial detention while cases dragged on.
Cousino, supra note 4, at 325.
See Lydia B. Tiede, Committing to Justice: An Analysis of Criminal Law Reforms in Chile 9 (Ctr. for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Working Paper, 2004)
(describing the laws, which included “attempt[s] to reduce the time period for
completion of criminal proceedings”).
68 See id. (explaining that although the 1980 changes theoretically increased
defendants’ rights, “these rights were seldom recognized”).).
69 Law No.19.047, Febrero 1, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), http://
bcn.cl/1vw3o [https://perma.cc/2QNN-PVQK].
70 Tiede, supra note 67, at 10.
71 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19(3), availble at http://www.oas.org/dil/esp/Constitucion_Chile.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U5KL-6QS7] (affirming that “Any person accused of a crime has the irrenounceable right to be assisted by a suitable defending attorney . . . . ”).
72 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000 – CHILE (2001), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
3ae6aa9318.html [https://perma.cc/7ZLS-8CMR] (explaining that “The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel, but indigent defendants do not always
receive effective legal representation. Indigent defendants . . . may be represented
by law students doing practical training, on occasion by a court-appointed lawyer,
or by a lawyer from the Government's legal assistance corporation.”); see also
Veliz, supra note 45, at 1366 (noting that law students served as public defenders).
66
67
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In the years immediately prior to the reform, almost 60% of Chile’s
incarcerated population was awaiting either trial or sentencing.73
The Chilean reform process began in earnest in 1992 after similar reforms had been enacted in El Salvador and Guatemala.74 Only during President Eduardo Frei’s term (1994–2000) did the reforms finally become a matter of public debate and, later,
governmental action. In June 1995, the reform proposal became
the subject of congressional debate and one of the principal priorities of President Frei’s administration.75 Chile differed from some
of its neighbors in how it characterized the reforms to the public.
While some reformers wanted to pursue a political strategy of
characterizing the reforms as merely technical or routine, this approach was rejected and the reformers instead embraced the radical nature of the proposed change, embarking on a broad campaign of public relations to gather popular support.76 The
reformers argued that the reforms were a political change that was
necessary to reflect the changed politics of the new Chilean state.77
The reforms of the late 1990s were incomparable to any previous
reforms in the country both in scope and in the approach reformers
took to their proposal and implementation. Broad popular support
was built through newspapers, seminars, and a conscious marketing campaign, as well as the unique historical momentum
throughout Latin America as many countries emerged from years
of dictatorship.78
Because many of the earlier attempts at reform by other countries had resulted in relatively superficial changes in the criminal
justice systems, Chile enacted a series of more radical reforms. Be73 CRISTIÁN RIEGO & MAURICIO DUCE, PRISIÓN PREVENTIVA Y REFORMA
PROCESAL PENAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA: EVALUACIÓN Y PERSPECTIVAS 156 (2009) (citing the Estadísticas Gendarmería de Chile detailing the makeup of the Chilean
prison population).
74 See Duce, supra note 35, at 196 (“The debate in Chile began at the end of
1992, when reforms like those in El Salvador and Guatemala had reached very
advanced stages, and a new Code was adopted in the Argentinian federal system.”).
75 See id. at 197 (discussing when the Chilean reform efforts became a subject
for public debate).
76 See id. at 200 (discussing media strategies and the reforms).
77 See id. at 202 (quoting Hammergren, Duce writes, “judicial reform is political, not in the sense of having political preferences, but because, as in politics, it is
about the legitimate allocation of values or about who gets what, when, and
how.”).
78 See id. at 215 (discussing the role of the media in building support for the
reform).
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tween the introduction of the first reform bill in 1995 and its eventual passage in 2000, Chile’s reform package continued to evolve in
a direction more adversarial and extreme than other projects in
Latin America, and more similar to an American-style tradition
than a tradition of Continental Europe.79 Pro-reform groups were
increasingly influenced by American and British systems and less
reliant on the German and Italian influences that had animated the
initial proposals.80 The reforms that ultimately passed in Chile resulted in a “much more adversarial model”81 than in other Latin
American countries.
Several reasons are possible for the increased Anglo-American
influence during the later stages of the drafting of the reform, including the fact that key members of the team drafting the reform
proposals pursued graduate legal studies at law schools in the
United States during this time and imported elements from those
systems into their proposals.82 Members of the Chilean judicial
79 See Riego, supra note 4, at 346 (discussing the elements of the new regulations that were imported from adversarial traditions).
80 See Muñoz, supra note 49, at 122–23 (discussing Anglo-American influence
on the reforms).
81 Riego, supra note 4, at 346.
82 See Muñoz, supra note 49, at 122–23 (discussing individuals who were significant in the reform and their training and experience in the United States, including Andres Bateylman, Mauricio Duce, Juan Enrique Vargas, and Cristian
Riego). In recent decades, Latin American legal culture has turned increasingly
away from a European focus toward a more American focus. Beginning around
the mid-1980s,

[G]raduate legal studies in the United States [became] increasingly popular, not only for Latin American business lawyers and political leaders,
but also for scholars and academics. In the past, the latter usually headed
to continental Europe for advanced degrees. Now increasing exposure to
Anglo-American legal culture has resulted in a greater focus on adjudication and its related set of concerns . . . .
Jorge L. Esquirol, The Turn to Legal Interpretation in Latin America, 26 AM. U. INT’L.
L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2011), http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1722&context=auilr [https://perma.cc/G94S-ZRVX]. Esquirol refers to these relationships as part of a “growing discursive community”
that looks more toward the United States than toward continental Europe. Id. at
1032–33; see also Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony
and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDS. 383, 384 (2002), http://
www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1260&context=ijgls
[https://perma.cc/6TSY-NL54] (stating that “The years following the Second
World War have shown a dramatic change in the pattern of world hegemony in
the law [concentrating in the United States as producer of legal culture and ideas].”). Mattei argues that U.S. adversarialism is a fundamental and constitutive
structure underlying the neo-liberal restructuring of the global economy and a
basic constitutive structure of U.S. hegemony. The “adversarial legalism” that de-
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system received information and financial assistance from the
United States. For example, the U.S. embassy in Santiago provided
funding with the intention of “strengthening democratic institutions, with particular emphasis on the judicial system.”83 During
the 1990s, the U.S. spent a great deal of time training members of
the Chilean judicial sector in adversarial skills necessary to “sustain the reform and ensure that new oral trials would be implemented effectively.”84
During this same period, Chilean observers were able to see
problems emerging in other countries that had adopted less radical
reforms. One such problem was the tendency of systems that had
previously embraced wholly written proceedings to slide back into
such a system by simply reading into court the written file, which
remained the salient determinant in criminal adjudication.85 Such
a practice resulted in meaningless oral trials and severely undercut
the practical impact of the reforms in other countries, leading one
Chilean reformer to describe the new system of oral trials in those
countries as “little more than the acting out of the file produced
during earlier stages.”86 As a reaction to these problems, and as a
result of the increasing Anglo-American influence, Chile’s reforms
eventually came to include restrictions on the judges’ access to the
case file, strict limitations on the use of out-of-court statements at
trial, and a system of adjudication driven much more by the parties
than by the judges.87 Ultimately, although the Chilean reform bill
was the product of a mix of influences both domestic and international, the end result reflected a heightened adversarialism and
showed the powerful role that institutions and structures from
United States systems came to play.88
fines U.S. legal culture “cannot be seen as a mere feature of American law, but is
actually the fundamental philosophy of globalization that, as a new layer of legal
systems forms worldwide, pushes for a complex variety of processes of privatization of the legal system. Id. at 390 n.27.
83 Cooper, supra note 15, at 540. The Embassy donated approximately $1 million to programs that included drafting the new code and training legal practitioners. Id.
84 Id.
85 See Riego, supra note 4, at 345 (explaining that due to European influence
and “Latin American tradition[s] of written practice,” the first oral trials in Latin
America tended to rely on the written file).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 346–47 & nn. 48–54 (listing reforms to Chilean procedure that favored
oral, adversarial practice).
88 See Muñoz, supra note 49, at 123 (describing the new Chilean criminal pro-
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The new criminal procedure code was first introduced in Congress in 1995 and was passed in 2000.89 The reforms in Chile set
out to completely divorce the prosecution from the judiciary by
creating a Public Ministry to carry out prosecutorial duties and by
explicitly limiting the powers of the judiciary.90 In the new system,
the prosecutor takes on the role of investigating and collecting evidence, rather than the judge.91 The law also introduced the concept
of prosecutorial discretion, codifying its acceptability within the
new system as well as attempting to regulate and constrain its
use.92 The prosecutor may, for example, opt to dismiss cases involving minor offenses under certain conditions.93
In December 2000, Chile began to phase in its new criminal justice system through pilot programs in certain geographic areas,
with the understanding that the new system would be gradually
phased in over several years, ultimately including Santiago in its

cedure code as “a translation of ideas that were imported and adapted to Chile’s
reality”).
89 Riego, supra note 4, at 340. Law 19.640 created the agency empowered to
prosecute crimes, while Law 19.718 subsequently created the national system of
public defenders and appointed criminal defense lawyers. Id. at 340 n.10.
90 See generally CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA ch. VI-Am; Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Ministerio Público, Law 19.640, Octubre 8, 1999, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] Chile, available at http://web.uchile.cl/archivos/derecho/CEDI/
Normativa/Ley%2019.640%20Ley%20Org%E1nica%20Constitucional%20Del%
20Ministerio%20Publico.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ4Z-NV6Y]; CÓD. PROC. PEN.
[C.P.P.], as amended DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], Octubre 12, 2000 (Chile), http://bcn.cl/
1uvvn [https://perma.cc/5KCM-65UV]; Código Procesal Penal, http://bcn.cl/
1uvvn [https://perma.cc/5KCM-65UV]; see also Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 255
(explaining that “The Public Ministry was created, with constitutional autonomy,
to take on prosecutorial duties. This agency was created to resolve issues of impartiality and objectivity within the area of criminal investigation.”).
91 See Riego, supra note 4, at 341 (discussing the changes in evidence procedure).
92 See CÓD. PROC. PEN. arts. 168–70 (giving the prosecutor certain discretionary powers); see also Cousino, supra note 4, at 338–46 (providing an overview of
role of increased prosecutorial discretion in the Chilean reforms); Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 257 (explaining the scope of prosecutorial discretion not to proceed
in a case, specifically when no crime has been committed, the statute of limitation
has expired, insufficient evidence, or when it is not in the public interest to prosecute minor crimes).
93 See Riego, supra note 4, at 341 (noting that the Code “introduces limited expressions of discretion for the prosecutor who may opt to dismiss a case (as long
as it involves a minor offense) under certain conditions”); see also Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 257 (explaining that minor offenses “carry sentences of less than
eighteen months” and this discretion may not be exercised in prosecuting “public
officials accused of official wrongdoing”).
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final phase.94 This progressive implementation of the reforms allowed actors in the criminal justice system to make adjustments in
response to challenges and problems as they arose in practice.95
The new Criminal Procedure Code allowed for plea bargaining
for the first time, although its use is limited by statute and it is still
relatively rare.96 The Code now authorizes a “procedimiento abreviado,” in which the accused agrees to accept the facts as alleged in
the indictment and in return, if convicted, receives a sentence previously agreed upon by the accused and the prosecutor.97 This
procedure cannot be used, however, in cases where the maximum
sentencing range exceeds five years.98 At least in theory and structure, judges have been converted from controlling and managing
the investigation and presentation of cases into “independent, impartial referees.”99
The most fundamental changes characterizing the new system
are the introduction of transparent, oral, public trials to adjudicate
all criminal allegations, as well as elimination of the role of the
judge in collecting evidence.100 Serious cases are tried before a
panel of three judges known as the “tribunal oral,” while less seri94 See Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 254 (describing the gradual transition of
the legal reforms). See also Antonio Marangunic & Todd Foglesong, CHARTING
JUSTICE REFORM IN CHILE: A COMPARISON OF THE OLD AND NEW SYSTEMS OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1 (2004) (noting that the system will be
complete in 2005 when it reaches Santiago).
95 The gradual implementation of the system was held up as an important
means of allowing the system to succeed and to gain public support. See Interview
with Claudio Perez, in Santiago, Chile (Oct. 28, 2014).
96 Law No. 19.696, Febrero 1, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] (Chile),
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=176595&tipoVersion=0
[https://
perma.cc/KWB4-WRY3]; see also Jan-Michael Simon, The Punishment of Serious
Crimes in Chile, in ULRICH SIEBER, THE PUNISHMENT OF SERIOUS CRIMES: VOLUME 2:
COUNTRY REPORTS 4 (Ulrich Sieber ed., 2004) (stating that “[T]he defendant agrees
to have his case put on trial under the abbreviated procedure and accepts the facts
as established in the indictment. . . . [T]his procedure is limited to those cases
where the previously fixed final sentence is under 5 years . . . . ”).
97 See Simon, The Punishment of Serious Crimes in Chile, supra note 96, at 4 (citing Book 4, Title III of the New C.P.P.).
98 Riego, supra note 4, at 341; COD. PROC. PEN.CPP arts. 388 & 406; see also Simon, The Punishment of Serious Crimes in Chile, supra note 96, at 4. Chile divides
crimes into three categories: crímenes, delitos simples, and faltas, which can be
conceived roughly into serious felonies, general felonies, and misdemeanors. See
id. at 2 (citing Article 3 of the C.P.P.).
99 See Hafetz, Pretrial Detention, supra note 33, at 1761 (citing Cousino, supra
note 4, at 353).
100 Riego, supra note 4, at 341 (citing C.P.P. art. 1 regarding oral and public
trials, and C.P.P. arts. 70, 77 & 79 regarding changes to the judge’s role).
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ous charges are tried to a single judge known as the “juez de garantías.”101 In a radical departure from prior practice, only that evidence introduced at the oral trial has evidentiary value in the case
against the accused.102
Shortly after the creation of the new prosecutorial agency, Chile
established a national public defender agency, the Defensoría Penal Pública.103 The law creates a national agency of public defenders. The office is headed by a presidentially-appointed national director who supervises several regional defenders, who in turn
supervise offices of public defenders at the local level.104 In addition to the public defenders employed by the DPP, the new system
created a network of private court-appointed defense lawyers
known as licitados, to complement the work of the DPP lawyers.105
Many observers see this hybrid arrangement as a strength of the
new system of indigent defense in Chile, as it allows for a degree of
competition and innovation among the different categories of defense lawyers.106 Ideally, a network of private defense lawyers can
provide an energy and a level of independence from government

Id. at 341 & n.14.
See id. at 341 (explaining that “evidence gathered by the prosecutor has no
value unless it is introduced at trial”). The pre-reform system in Chile was dominated by the “juez de instrucción,” a single judge who was empowered to gather
evidence, lead the police investigation, decide which charges would be brought (if
any), and ultimately render a verdict and impose sentence. See id. at 339–40 &
nn.3–6 (citing the old Código Procesal Penal). All evidence gathered against the
accused was done in writing and the accused had no access to the written file until after the evidence-gathering phase had concluded and charges had been
brought. Id. All of the proceedings were conducted in writing and at the direction
of a single judge. See Cousino, supra note 4, at 325 (noting the central role the
judge plays in the inquisitorial system).
103 Law No. 19.718, Febrero 27, 2001, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] (Chile),
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=182755&tipoVersion=0
[https://
perma.cc/PY9X-NSSU].
104 See
Estructura
organizacional,
DEFENSORIA
PENAL
PUBLICA,
http://www.dpp.cl/pag/78/81/organigrama
[https://perma.cc/F3M8-W9JL]
(last visited Dec. 13, 2015) (providing an organizational chart of the Chilean public
defender offices).
105 See id.; see also Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 256 (noting that the public defender system is enhanced by “licitaciones publicas”—the “public system of contract attorneys”).
106 See Interview with Juan Enrique Vargas, Dean of the School of Law, Diego
Portales University, in Santiago, Chile (Oct. 21, 2014) (expressing hope that this
hybrid system would allow for an evaluation of the relative benefits of each group
and a general improvement in the level of representation from both groups as a
result.
101
102
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control.107 One important aspect of the Chilean law is the endowment of the right of the accused to a change of appointed counsel—
a personal right that does not require the accused to provide a reason—at least in the first instance.108 The Defensorías Regionales
maintain a list of private attorneys who can handle criminal cases.
Those accused of a crime can select from this list, and if available,
that attorney will be appointed.109
There can be little doubt that the reforms to the criminal justice
system in Chile have improved the quality of justice from virtually
all perspectives. Criminal charges are resolved much more quickly
than under the old system, rates of pretrial detention are far lower
than in the old system,110 and the public has expressed widespread
support for the reforms.111 According to opinion polls, the reforms
to the criminal justice system are popular with the Chilean public,
with strong majorities expressing the opinion that the new system
is quicker, more transparent, and generally preferable to the old
system.112 In contrast to the pre-reform system, Chilean arrest and
trial procedures are now uniformly regarded as in compliance with
international norms of fairness.113 Notwithstanding these impres107 See Interview with Cristian Riego, Professor, Diego Portales University, in
Santiago, Chile (Aug. 28, 2014) (describing the current system as too large and too
public, and explaining that it could be strengthened by cultivating a more robust
group of independent lawyers).
108 Alex Carocca Pérez, La Nueva Defensa Penal Pública 13 (2004),
http://w1.cejamericas.org/index.php/biblioteca/biblioteca-virtual/doc_view/
859-la-nueva-defensa-penal-p%C3%BAblica.html
[https://perma.cc/Q6B5-GN
ZM].
109 RAÚL TAVOLARI OLIVEROS, INSTITUCIONES DEL NUEVO PROCESO PENAL:
CUESTIONES Y CASOS 44 (Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 2005).
110 See Riego, supra note 4, at 352–53 (estimating that three quarters of inmates
have been sentenced under the new reforms, whereas prior to the reforms, half of
all inmates were waiting for sentencing).
111 See id. at 347–48 (noting the community’s preference for public trials).
112 See id. at 348 & n.59 (2008) (citing polls from 2004 and 2006 that measured
Chilean satisfaction with the judicial reforms).
113 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
PRACTICES
FOR
2013:
CHILE,
at
7–8
(2014),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220640.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CB7Y-8A8J],

The law provides for the right to legal counsel, and public defenders’ offices across the country provided professional legal counsel to anyone
seeking such assistance. . . . Defendants can confront or question adverse
witnesses and present witnesses and evidence on their behalf, although
the law provides for secret witnesses in certain circumstances. Defendants and their attorneys generally have access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases.
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sive achievements, the system now faces very real challenges in attaining a truly adversarial justice system.
4.

LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEWLY ADVERSARIAL
DEFENSE LAWYER

Although Chile has established new procedures intended to
provide meaningful and equal representation for criminal defendants, the reforms are facing a challenge: transitioning from the inquisitorial culture and expectations to an adversarial culture. An
adversarial defense attorney cannot truly be effective unless she
embraces adversarialism and all that it entails. This includes conducting factual investigations to challenge the prosecutor’s narrative, developing a coherent and compelling theory of the case, challenging the prosecutor’s legal arguments, and advocating for the
client’s expressed interests. During the reforms, the prosecutor
gained significant power. Although the creation of a public defender’s office was an important step in systemic reform, many defenders retain a self-conception of the defense lawyer as a reactive
or passive player in the system, and remain entrenched in the inquisitorial mindset. Without a zealous and adversarial defense, the
new prosecutorial power goes unchecked and the impact of imbalance in the judicial system may be manifesting in an increase in
Chile’s prison population.
For better or for worse, Chile has been used for many decades
as a laboratory for ideas about reform. A positive explanation for
this history is that Chile has a long tradition of openness to outside
influences and ideas, and a willingness to experiment with proposals for radical reform.114 Legal reforms are one area in which
the country has a long history of receptivity to external influences.115 Although this seems to present an overly optimistic take
on recent history in view of the 1973 coup and covert activity on
the part of the United States over the last half of the twentieth century, it is true that Chileans have traditionally been receptive to re114 See Cooper, supra note 15, at 521–22 (noting Chile’s historical tendencies
towards legal transplantation).
115 Id. at 521 (stating that “Chileans are often celebrated as the best adapters
and adopters of legal reforms because they have strong institutions to support
democratic government and the rule of law. Chile has had a history of legal transplantation since it first declared independence in 1810.”).
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ceiving and implementing outside ideas and proposals.116 Whether
this is due primarily to outside influence or domestic willingness,
Chile “has long been a testing ground for judicial reform, the creation of markets, and economic integration.”117
In addition to the broad changes in formal procedure, Chile
had to create new institutions that would administer the new adversarial system of justice. As noted above, the legislature created
the new prosecutorial agency, the Ministerio Público, in 2000,118
and then the new public defender agency, the Defensoría Penal
Pública, in 2001.119 These entirely new institutions constituted a
clear break with historical antecedents and presented an opportunity to define the goals and objectives of each new player in the
reformed criminal justice system.120 True reform in Chile required
a radical redefinition of the roles of the prosecutors, judges, and
defense lawyers, and the various institutions differed in the degree
of success with which they carried out this redefinition.121
Based on several months of firsthand observations and inter116 Id. at 521–24 (discussing the impact of the 1973 military coup on Chile’s
legal system).
117 Id. at 521; see also YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST
TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 141 (2002) (referring to Chile as a “laboratory in which contenders for legitimate state expertise in the north invested heavily”). Obviously, Chile was used as a testing ground for radical neo-liberal economic policies from 1973 until 1990 under the Pinochet dictatorship, but it is
difficult to argue that this was anything but an externally-imposed experiment
and certainly cannot be explained by evidence of the country’s “strong institutions to support democratic government.”
118 Law No. 19.640, Octubre 15, 1999, D.O. (Chile), https://www.leychile.cl/
Navegar?idNorma=145437&tipoVersion=0 [https://perma.cc/PF5C-LM9M]; see
also Riego, supra note 4, at 340 (describing how “[i]n 2000, after a long debate,
Congress introduced a new Criminal Procedure Code and created a new prosecutorial agency and public defense system.”).
119 Law No. 19.718, Marzo 10, 2001, D.O. (Chile), https://www.leychile.cl/
Navegar?idNorma=182755&tipoVersion=0 [https://perma.cc/P8D3-MZLB].
120 See Duce, supra note 10, at 1.
121 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 331:

“’While suppressing the inquisitorial system, the reform should result in
the establishment of the basis for a new definition of roles in the criminal
justice system. This definition may take different specific directions, but
the sole existence of three different institutional actors such as Judges,
the Prosecutors and the Public Defenders are bases on which it is possible to build a more sophisticated system that may develop a balance between the effectiveness and respect of individual rights.’”
(quoting Cristián Riego, The Chilean Criminal Procedure Reform 34 (1997) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin Law School)).
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views that I conducted, as well as existing scholarship, I analyze
the challenges facing public defenders in Chile in three broad categories: (1) a lack of a clear mission or set of objectives for the public defender within the new system; (2) an anachronistic understanding of the role of the public defender as purely reactive and
passive, an orientation that is most likely a vestige of the role of the
defense lawyer in an inquisitorial system; and (3) an undertheorization of the motivations of public defenders and indigent
defense organizations. These three critiques of the public defender
in today’s Chile are obviously interrelated and present challenges
to the fulfillment of the promise of the defense lawyer within an
adversarial system.
4.1 Lack of a Clear Mission
In creating the new institutions, Chilean reformers and legislators devoted far more thought, and expended much more energy,
on the design and definition of the prosecutorial entity than on its
defensive counterpart.122 The Defensoría Penal Pública appears in
the reforms as both a literal and a substantive afterthought. One
architect of the reforms put it quite bluntly: “[w]e knew that we
needed a defense lawyer, but we did not focus on the details.”123
The legislation authorizing and creating the agency literally came
after the other substantive reforms.124 More importantly, the design and creation of the Defensoría Penal Pública lacked a full conceptualization of what kind of defense services, indeed, what kind
of defense lawyer, the new system anticipated. One observer identified the heart of the problem: “[t]he public defender institution
has a problem of defining its mission or role.”125
An example of the under-theorizing of the defense lawyer in
the new system can be seen in the intellectual history of the reforms. Professor Mauricio Duce, one of the central leaders of the
reforms, has described the beginnings of the discussions about re122 See id. at 330 (explaining that the reforms require the prosecutors to handle
the most difficult tasks, including absorption of judicial powers).
123 Interview with Vargas, supra note 106.
124 See supra notes 95–103 (discussing the development of the reforms for the
prosecutor and defense agencies).
125 Interview with Mauricio Duce, Professor, Diego Portales University, in
Santiago, Chile (Aug. 29, 2014).
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form among Chilean academics.126 Duce describes the first public
discussion of such a reform in a November 1992 conference organized by the Corporación de Promoción Universitaria (CPU).127
This conference introduced the topic of a possible Chilean reform
in general terms, while a subsequent series of discussions in 1993
dealt with particular aspects of the reform proposal in more detail,
inviting both Chilean and international experts to take up certain
critical aspects of the reform.128 According to Duce, the group then
met on nine occasions between 1993 and 1994 to design the new
system, discussing topics such as the general functioning of the
Chilean criminal justice system, general principles of oral trials,
rules of evidence, prosecutorial discretion, and the role of the prosecutor.129 Nowhere, however, does Duce discuss any attempts to
address the role of the defense lawyer or of the national public defender institution during any of these early theoretical discussions.
Without an articulation of the objectives of the DPP or individual public defenders, no clear criteria exist upon which to evaluate
whether the institution and the individuals within it are succeeding. Attempts to define success in this regard seem invariably to
retreat into the bureaucratic. An early effort by the first national
director of the agency, Alex Carroca Perez, laid out three criteria by
which public defenders or private attorneys contracting to provide
indigent defense services should be evaluated: (1) the professional
quality of the services provided, including the promptness and attention that the attorneys pay to their clients; (2) orderliness and
efficiency of the management of resources; and (3) the soundness
of the internal management methods employed.130 Like the legislation creating the DPP, the formula reads bureaucratically, without
any guidance as to the real role of the public defender with regard
either to the client or the system generally.
The law establishing the DPP and its accompanying legislative
history spend a remarkable number of pages on necessary reports,
126 See generally Duce, supra note 35 (discussing the reform process of Chile’s
criminal justice system).
127 See id. at 204 (“The first public event that established the need to discuss
structural reform of the criminal justice system was an international seminar organized by CPU in November 1992.”).
128 See id. (discussing the 1993 conference).
129 See id. at 205, n.13 (describing the general topics discussed during the nine
meetings).
130 See Pérez, supra note 108, at 13 (discussing ways of implementing a new
public criminal defense system)._
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inspections, and management of the bureaucracy of the DPP, with
virtually no mention of what either the individual public defender
or the institution is expected to do in the new system.131 The law
reflects a troubling lack of specificity or vision in articulating the
expectations for the new institution. The stated objective in the
legislation was simply to provide criminal defense to anyone accused of a criminal offense of any sort who does not have a lawyer.132 The legislation goes to great lengths to lay out the bureaucratic structure of the office and the three levels of national
administration, but never elaborates on the goals, aspirations, or
expectations of the office, or any individual public defender beyond the most basic goal: providing a warm body to defend the
accused.
A common and profound problem among countries that have
moved to an ostensibly adversarial system from an inquisitorial
system is the lack of training for defense lawyers on how and why
to conduct fact investigations.133 This phenomenon is likely a cultural holdover from the old system, in which the defense lawyer
was intended to play a purely reactive role.134 Describing problems in moving Mexico’s criminal justice system from inquisitorialism to adversarialism, Carlos Ríos Espinoza argued for “the need
to empower the defense to develop a parallel or verification investigation that serves as a counterbalance to the prosecution’s investigation, and allows the defense to develop and present evidence if
it so chooses.”135 The impediments to this kind of change are cul131 See generally Law No. 19.718, Febrero 27, 2001, D.O. (Chile), https://
www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=182755&tipoVersion=0 [https://perma.cc/
3KWZ-RBR9] (creating the public defender’s office).
132 See id. at art. 2:

The Public Defenders’ Office aims to provide criminal defense to those
charged or accused of committing a crime, misdemeanor or offence, in
the context of plea bargaining or a criminal trial in their respective tribunals, as required, to those who lack legal counsel.
133 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 350–51 (explaining that criticism of the public
defense agency stems from “the economical situation . . . [and] the absence of institutional structures at the federal level to support and provide the minimum
training, guidelines, and development of local agencies.”).
134 See Riego, supra note 4, at 340 (explaining that under the inquisitorial system, the defendant could respond only when the judge had completed the investigation and determined which charges to bring).
135 Carlos Ríos Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico’s Criminal Procedure: The States’
Turning Point, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 53, 81 (2008), http://heinonline.org/HOL/
Page?handle=hein.journals/sjlta15&start_page=53&collection=journals&id=55
[https://perma.cc/8PXJ-E2PH].
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tural rather than structural, however, as the procedural framework
does exist in the new systems for defense lawyers to interview and
subpoena witnesses and conduct other fact investigations.136 The
scarcity of examples of such lawyering is not a result of the written
law, but of the practiced understanding of the role of the defense
lawyer. For example, public defenders in Chile have the right to
ask for money for expert witnesses, but very few do so.137 This
demonstrates that the problems facing the public defender system
in Chile are not as connected to a lack of resources as they are to
cultural challenges: individual public defenders still tend to conceive of their role as passive rather than active.138
Many Chilean public defenders fail to conduct an independent
factual investigation into their cases. According to Leonardo
Moreno, former head of the Santiago North office of the Defensoría
Penal Pública, it is almost unheard of for defense lawyers to investigate their cases. Public defender offices do not keep investigators
on staff, and although defense lawyers can ask for funds to hire investigators, most will not. Moreno estimates that less than 1% of
the budget for hiring outside experts is spent on investigators. After the reforms, several universities opened programs for training
criminal investigators, but ultimately closed the programs because
their graduates could not find jobs. 139 Chilean public defenders also struggle with the ability to develop and navigate a defense case
to counter the prosecution’s case. Some Chilean defense lawyers
do not understand that they are required to take an active role in
defending their client, and seem to have a hard time discarding the
inquisitorial and bureaucratic mentality. 140
To their credit, the reformers in Chile realized immediately
that the actors in the criminal justice system would lack certain
skills, expertise, and experience necessary to fulfill their intended
functions in the new system.141 Many resources were devoted to
136 See Katherine Kauffman, Chile’s Revamped Criminal Justice System, SUMMIT
621, 631–40 (Nov. 8, 2012), http://thesummit.gjil.org/2012/10/articles-chilesrevamped-criminal.html [https://perma.cc/4YDS-GS6G] (last visited Feb. 1,
2017) (describing the new Chilean criminal procedure).
137 See Interview with Mauricio Duce, supra note 125.
138 Id.
139 Interview with Leonardo Moreno, Professor, Alberto Hurtado University
in Santiago, Chile (Oct. 27, 2014).
140 Interview with Claudio Pérez, supra note 95.
141 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 333–34 (explaining that the most difficult
challenge for the Chilean reformers is changing the legal culture and addressing
skill deficiencies).
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filling this gap in terms of “skills training.” The majority of the
training, however, has focused on trial skills and lawyering within
the courtroom, with not enough focus on what the lawyer does
outside of the courtroom. In an interview, Mauricio Duce expressed that, “Training is not culture.”142 According to Duce, both
the DPP and the Ministerio Público seized the initiative and
trained themselves, thereby losing contact with (and input from)
universities and other outside influences.143 Legal training focuses
primarily on black-letter law and, to some extent, trial advocacy,
but does not explore anything more complex. Duce explains that,
“Probably they perceive that there is no problem. It is invisible to
them.”144 After the institutions were created and became independent, their evolution stopped. This focus on trial skills to the
exclusion of ethical or cultural education has failed to convey the
importance of lawyering outside of the courtroom and of thinking
broadly and creatively about the role of the defense lawyer in an
adversarial setting.
Many Latin American countries have created public defender
offices similar to those in the United States, including the widespread funding and resource problems found in many such United
States institutions. Throughout most of Latin America (as well as
the United States), public defender offices lack the support, both
financial and otherwise, enjoyed by the prosecution and the judiciary.145 Although creating a system of public defenders is a step
towards equal justice, the mere presence of a poorly funded public
defender organization within a system, or an overworked and underpaid public defender in the courtroom, is not a significant or
meaningful step toward protecting the rights and interests of the
accused.146 In many Latin American countries that have created
Interview with Mauricio Duce, supra note 125.
Id.
144 Id.
145 See Margaret Popkin, Acceso a la justicia, gobernabilidad democrática y sociedad civil, in JUSTICIA: UN VÍNCULO PENDIENTE ENTRE ESTADO, CIUDADANÍA, Y
DESARROLLO 177, 193 (Carlos Cordovez, ed. 2007), https://publications.iadb.org/
bitstream/handle/11319/250/Justicia.pdf;jsessionid=B82991CF6829406E3C367FF
CB02BD4E2?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/LR5Y-TQQR].
146 See generally John D. King, Recognizing the Limits of the Right to Counsel as a
Guarantee of Justice, in LA REVISTA DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 67 (2014),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=68911009811200500703102907800
507307503900601400706406609306907606902602111200009408103803500004310600
304607001911509108808111702705308208402207006611909511610008703806404511
209107511200207301908611202701911808910909212111406811008406608107306508
142
143
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public defender institutions, because of inadequate funding, “legal
representation remains more a formality than a guarantee of a serious defense.”147 Fortunately, Chile has not yet encountered the
problem of inadequate resources in funding its criminal justice system generally, or its indigent defense system specifically.148 Although the costs of the criminal justice system post-reform is substantially higher than the costs of the pre-reform system,149 there
seems to be no push to reduce funding for indigent criminal defense, and few complaints from public defenders about levels of
funding.150
The real problem facing the Chilean public defender system is
not a funding shortage or a crippling workload, as it is in many
other Latin American countries and the United States. The absence
of factual investigation by defense lawyers in Chile is due to a failure to adopt certain facets of adversarial legal culture: zealous advocacy, investigation, and independent factual inquiry to challenge
the prosecutor’s claims. To complete the transformation, Chilean
attorneys must reconsider their expectations and understanding of
advocacy and reject the traditional inquisitorial approach to the
9017&EXT=pdf [https://perma.cc/3CV7-TELH] (comparing the Chilean justice
system and counsel’s role in providing justice to that of the United States).
147 Popkin, supra note 145, at 194 (citing Cristián Riego &Fernando Santelices
Arizita, Informe Comparative: Proyecto seguimiento de los procesos de reforma judicial en
América Latina, in SISTEMAS JUDICIALES 2(3) (2002)).
148 See Interview with Vargas, supra note 106; see also Interview with Claudio
Pérez, supra note 95. In the interview, Perez said that the DPP lawyers are welltrained and now there are plenty of them. At the beginning, there were insufficient lawyers for the caseloads, but that problem has now been solved. With the
increasing numbers of defense lawyers in the DPP, however, he has seen a new
problem. While the initial energy and impetus for defense work was very strong,
the intensity has diminished. The level of zeal (my word, not his) has decreased
since the reforms as the momentum and excitement of the new system has dissipated. Id.
149 The annual operating cost of the old Chilean criminal justice system was
USD $50M, approximately 0.8% of the national budget. The cost of the new Chilean criminal justice system in 2008 was USD $212M, approximately 2.0% of the
national budget. See Riego, supra note 4, at 342 n.26 (discussing the Chilean criminal justice budget); see also Duce, supra note 35, at 233 (discussing the reform process of Chile’s justice system). It is worth noting that the Chilean reform process
has occurred within the context of a strong and growing national economy, without which it might have been much less popular and maybe not even possible.
See Riego, supra note 4 at 355 (explaining that “. . . Chile’s reform was produced in
a context of great political and economic stability.” (citing MAURICIO DUCE &
CRISTIAN RIEGO, PROCESO PENAL, 76 (2007))).
150 But see Véliz, supra note 45, at 1372 (complaining about underfunding in
the Defensoría Penal Pública and noting budget shortages).
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role of the defense lawyer.

4.2 Passivity
Vestiges of Chile’s inquisitorial past haunt the post-reform system, especially regarding the role of the public defender. Defense
lawyers in the modern Chilean system remain generally passive
and reactive in their approach to lawyering and generally have a
quite restrictive view of what the job of the defense lawyer entails.
Under the old inquisitorial system, of course, there existed very little room for active or zealous defense lawyering.151
Defense lawyers in the Chilean system have been slow to
change in many of these respects. An early evaluation of the reforms by two leading Chilean academics found problems in the
quality of the public defenders within the new system, “especially
in the development of a proactive role during the preliminary stages of the process and in the development of the capacity to counter
in a meaningful manner the prosecution’s cases.”152 Based on observations over several months and conversations with many actors in the Chilean criminal justice system, this problem persists.
The critique of Chilean defense lawyers as “generally passive”
is a common one. In an interview, Duce elaborated on this description and the rationales:
Generally speaking, public defenders in Chile are extremely
passive [“extremadamente pasivo”]. They do not conduct
their own investigations and still do not even ask the prosecutors to review the government’s investigation prior to trial. The central question to study regarding public defenders in Chile is one of passivity versus action [“pasividad vs.
actividad”].153
During the planning of the reforms in Chile, there was virtually
See Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 255 (describing the inquisitorial system).
Duce, supra note 35 at 242 (citing Andres Baytelman & Mauricio Duce,
Evaluacion de la Reforma Procesal Penal: Estado de una Reforma en Marcha, Santiago,
Chile (2003)) (translation by the author).
153 Interview with Duce, supra note 125.
151
152
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no debate regarding the scope of the right to appointed counsel.154
As a result, that right is as broad as it possibly could be, covering
every type of crime regardless of possible punishment and covering every defendant regardless of ability to pay.155 Many have argued that the scope of this right is overly broad and financially unsustainable.156 A more profound critique is that this indiscriminate
breadth of the right to appointed counsel has perpetuated a bureaucratic mindset among Chile’s public defenders that continues
today.157
In observing court proceedings in Chile, it is clear why Chilean
defense lawyers are described as passive. Juan Enrique Vargas,
one of the architects of the criminal justice reforms, decried the
“automatic nature” of the work of many public defenders. Vargas
described many of today’s defense lawyers in Chile as feeling that,
because the results are preordained in their cases, it makes no
sense to put in much effort.158 Others go further and describe the
role of the public defender in Chile as simply legitimizing the process without providing much real benefit to the accused.159
154 See generally King, supra note 146 (discussing how the Chilean adversarial
system could be changed to be more just).
155 See id. (comparing the justice system in the United States and Chile to discern how the Chilean system can be made more just); see also RAÚL TAVOLARI
OLIVEROS, INSTITUCIONES DEL NUEVO PROCESO PENAL: CUESTIONES Y CASOS 69 (Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 2005).
156 See OLIVEROS, supra note 155, at 69 (arguing that such a broad promise of
representation will lead either to a financially unsustainable system, or a deterioration in the quality of defense representation, or both). Oliveros proposes that
Chile follow the lead of many developed countries and restrict the availability of
court-appointed counsel to serious cases, in order to save money and to maintain
a high level of representation. Id. See also Interview with Riego, supra note 107.
157 See Interview with Riego, supra note 107 (describing an industrial or bureaucratic mindset that continues within the DPP).
158 See Interview with Vargas, supra note 106 (“The routine is a great enemy
of quality.”).
159 See OLIVEROS, supra note 155, at 43. Defense lawyers can serve this “legitimizing” function in the United States as well. In his dissent in Lafler v. Cooper,
Justice Scalia argued that even though counsel allegedly provided incompetent
advice to reject a plea bargain, Cooper “received the exorbitant gold standard of
American justice—a full-dress criminal trial with its innumerable constitutional
and statutory limitations upon the evidence that the prosecution can bring forward . . . .” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even
in the companion case, Missouri v. Frye, in which counsel did not even tell the client about a plea offer, Justice Scalia argued that “the process was fair, [and] the
defendant acknowledged the correctness of the conviction.” Missouri v. Frye, 132
S. Ct. 1399, 1412 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia acknowledged that
Frye’s attorney made a mistake, but it “did not deprive Frye of any substantive or
procedural right . . . . ” Id. Some scholars argue that the attorney is compliant in
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The issue of passivity includes an overly restrictive view of the
work of the defense lawyer as limited to inside of the courtroom.
Although some Chilean observers have made this point, the
change has been slow to develop. It is crucial to understand that
the professional role of the public defender is broader than simply
being present at court proceedings. It encompasses everything,
beginning with the investigation. A defense lawyer must be actively involved in the case long before trial.160
For the defense to play its envisioned role in the structure of
Chile’s adversarial system, a next generation of reforms must focus
on empowering defense lawyers to play a more active, creative,
and comprehensive part in the adjudication of crimes.161 In order
to provide a meaningful check on the growing power of the prosecutor, Chilean public defenders should commit to an active defense
based on independent investigations and the gathering of defense
evidence to counter the prosecution theory.162 Unlike the inquisitothis system of “legitimacy” by continuing in representations that may be limited
by lack of resources. See Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1124–25 (2013), http://0-heinonline.org.lola.law.upenn.
edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/waslee70&div=26&start_page=1089&
collection=journals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults
[http://perma.cc/
V4YB-EHLH] (suggesting that by fulfilling ethical obligations, public defenders
could “‘cease to be an essential part of a fraudulent cover-up of the denial of fundamental rights to countless poor people who are caught up in a criminal justice
system that is unethical, unconstitutional, and intolerably cruel.’” (quoting
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 71 (3d ed.
2004))). In deciding several important cases relating to defendants’ rights, the U.S.
Supreme Court “reiterate[d] the traditional legal conception of a defense lawyer
based on the ideological perception of a criminal case as an adversary, combative
proceeding in which counsel for the defense assiduously musters all the admittedly limited resources at his command . . . . ” Abraham S. Blumburg, The Practice of
Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC. REV.
15, 18 (1967) (emphasis in original). Blumburg wonders, however, if “the Supreme
Court’s conception of the role of counsel in a criminal case square[s] with social
reality[.]” Id.
160 See OLIVEROS, supra note 155, at 215:
If any person has the right to legal defense and if the right to know the
evidence constitutes a modality of such right, the investigation carried
out by the defense lawyer, in order to determine the facts and the means
by which they can be corroborated, shall not be considered effective unless fully realized, as the constitutional promise of acknowledgement to
the right to defense.
161 See id. at 69 (“The defense quality of those charged or accused may be improved by means of a more creative and innovative approach that increases the
level of debate and the requirements regarding the investigation and criminal
prosecution.”).
162 Id.
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rial system, which is imagined as a neutral inquiry, the adversarial
system is often compared to a game or contest between competitors:
As with other contests, such as football games, cricket
matches, or even pool, a large number of procedural rules
are necessary to ensure that the contest will be well-run and
fair to all sides. As with other contests, fairness can be
achieved only if the lawyers representing the respective
parties are of equal ability and have equal resources.163
Inquisitorialism envisions a passive defense lawyer, whose job
is merely to ensure that the State administrators have complied
with the appropriate procedures in reaching their conclusion. But
adversarialism generally absolves the State of the responsibility of
reaching the correct substantive conclusion, instead relying on the
parties to reach an accurate result through a fairly administered
process. For this reason, a passive defense lawyer can cause much
more harm in an adversarial than an inquisitorial system.
4.3 The Passive Defender and Mass Incarceration
The Chilean public defender system was modeled in large part
on the United States’ public defender system. In the years since it
adopted the adversarial system of criminal adjudication and the
new system of criminal defense, Chile has struggled with a problem that exists in the United States: mass incarceration.164
The prison population can be used as a marker for progress
of the Chilean reforms in two ways. First, changes in prisoner
composition indicate that the system is moving individuals
through the criminal justice system more rapidly.165 The majority
163 James W. Diehm, The Introduction of Jury Trials and Adversarial Elements into
the Former Soviet Union and Other Inquisitorial Countries, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POLY.
1, 6 (2001) (citing BARTON INGRAHAM, THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 26–
30 (1987)); see also JOHN LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY
58 (1977) (providing an overview of Germany’s criminal procedure system).
164 See Riego, supra note 4, at 355 (discussing the growing concern regarding
the relationship between the Chilean criminal justice reforms and the increase in
the country’s prison population).
165 See RIEGO & DUCE, supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing and
evaluating the reform of preventive detention and criminal procedures in Chile
and other parts of Latin America).
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of inmates have already been sentenced.166 The old codes of procedure took a long time to resolve cases even with the defendant in
custody—only 6.9% of cases were closed in under fifteen
months.167 As of 2007, under the new procedural codes, 36.4% of
cases in which the defendant was in custody were closed within
fifteen months.168 One of the goals of the reform was to “manag[e]
and reduc[e] the backlog of the criminal courts and minimiz[e] the
number of cases ending without adjudication or sentence.”169 Increasing access to justice is an important part of improving the judicial system. This efficiency, however, may also relate to the second marker of Chilean “progress”—the prison population has
increased significantly since the reforms.170
Year

Prison Population
Total

1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014

15,230
20,235
22,593
22,027
33,050
34,901
36,374
39,417
48,826
54,628
51,882
45,501

Prison Population
Rate (Per 100,000 of
national population)
136
167
171
153
215
222
226
240
291
320
298
257

Although the prison population has declined somewhat in
the last few years, it still remains significantly higher than in the
166 See Riego, supra note 4, at 352–53 (explaining that, in 2007–2008, approximately three-quarters of inmates had been sentenced while the rest awaited trial);
see also World Prison Brief: Chile, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POL’Y RESEARCH, http://
www.prisonstudies.org/country/chile [https://perma.cc/PS9R-U7WJ] (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter World Prison Brief] (listing a pretrial detainee rate of
33.8% as of November 30, 2016).
167 Riego, supra note 4, at 352.
168 Id.
169 Cousino, supra note 4, at 328.
170 World Prison Brief, supra note 166.
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pre-reform years.171 This increase in the prison population is likely
due to a number of factors, but the procedural reforms seem likely
to have played a major role.
Chile is one of the safer countries in Latin America, with an average homicide rate of fewer than four per 100,000 inhabitants per
year for almost the last decade (2005–2012).172 Chile, however, has
a relatively high prison population rate. Some of this is certainly
due to harsh drug laws. In 2005, Chile passed Law 20.000, which
increased penalties for possession of drugs like marijuana and established penalties for “micro-trafficking”—possession of smaller
quantities of drugs.173 Both the United States and Chile have
struggled with mass incarceration, and harsh drug laws appear to
be a factor in the size of both countries’ prison populations.174
Id.
Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 people), WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5
[https://perma.cc/Y6KE-WHNW]
(last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
173 Current Drug Laws in Chile, TNI, (Jan. 1, 2010), https://www.tni.org/en/
article/current-drug-laws-chile [https://perma.cc/TKM5-85BH] (last visited
Nov. 16, 2015). See Jorge Kawas, Harsher Prison Sentences Don’t Curb Crime,
AMERICAS Q. (Winter 2015), http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/harsherprison-sentences-dont-curb-crime [https://perma.cc/9GXB-CHPG] (last visited
Nov. 16, 2015) (discussing the relationship between harsher drug sentencing laws
and Chile’s prison conditions). As can be seen in the table above, the number of
individuals incarcerated increased substantially between 2004 and 2006. Chile’s
prison population, however, has declined since 2012. This may be due to a 2013
amendment to Law 18.216, providing alternative sentences for drug- and alcoholrelated offenses. Law No. 18.216, as amended by Decreto No. 629, Septiembre 17,
2013, D.O. (Chile). See Javiera Blanco Suarez, Medias alternativas a la reclusión: Freno a la delincuencia, DERECHO PENAL 20, 22 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://
www.pazciudadana.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2011-04-04_Medidasalternativas-a-la-reclusi%C3%83%C2%B3n-freno-a-la-delincuencia.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3ANQ-YHBX] (contemplating alternatives to incarceration, such as rehabilitation); see also Javier E. Velasquez Valenzuela, Origen del Paradigma de Riesgo, 9 POL. CRIM. ONLINE 58, 59 (2014), http://www.scielo.cl/pdf/politcrim/
v9n17/art03.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HEV-LXCA] (noting changes to Law 18.216
and discussing the origin and effect of technologies predicting recidivism of criminals). See generally Law No. 20.000, Febrero 2, 2005, D.O. (Chile) (indicating that
harsher drug laws may certainly be a contributing factor to the increase in Chile’s
prison population—individuals sentenced for drug offenses increased significantly in the five years following the passage of Law 20.000).
174 Kawas, supra note 173 (explaining that harsher drug laws created a “substantial” impact on Chile’s prison system). See Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass
Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2013) (quoting “The U.S.
incarceration rate climbed steadily throughout a thirty-year period beginning in
the mid-1970s—coinciding with the most aggressive era of the United States’ War
on Drugs.”); but see John Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1237, 1239–40 (2012) (exploring the variety of causes, including in171
172
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The Chilean adversarial system was intended to expedite adjudication and deliver justice more efficiently.175 From the standpoint of efficiency alone, it has succeeded. The reformers introduced a number of innovations intended to “make conflict
resolution more efficient, without necessarily going all the way
through to sentencing at trial.”176 Some of those innovations include “conditional suspension of proceedings (similar to probation),” and the “abbreviated proceeding (similar to a plea bargain).”177 Treating efficiency as a premium was intended to
remedy some of the worst abuses of the inquisitorial system—
namely slow and “exceedingly bureaucratic proceedings” that left
a substantial percentage of prisoners awaiting sentencing for an
indefinite period of time.178 The old system was also shockingly
one-sided.179 The new system is certainly efficient, and is facially
less one-sided, but these changes may have had an unintended
consequence in that they appear to have streamlined convictions,
resulting in a substantial increase in Chile’s prison population.180
For that reason, efficiency may not be the best marker of reform.
Instead, examining the nature of the process itself as well as
whether its participants—judges, prosecutors, and defenders—are
truly invested in that process may be a better way to identify
whether meaningful change has occurred.181
The other primary goal of the reforms was improving protections for individual rights, including “basic due process standards
creased prosecution rates, increased crime rates, and changes in economic conditions, political attitudes, and racial policies, behind the rise in prison growth).
175 See Véliz, supra note 45, at 1367 (noting that the new system emphasizes
immediacy, transparency, and efficiency); see also Cousino, supra note 4, at 328
(explaining that one of the main goals of the reform was “efficiency, including
managing and reducing the backlog of the criminal courts and minimizing the
number of cases ending without adjudication or sentence”).
176 Véliz, supra note 45, at 1367.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1365.
179 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,
supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing inequalities in the old justice system—specifically the use of law students as defenders).
180 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 328 (explaining that the reforms were intended to lead to decisive conclusions for each criminal matter). It is not unreasonable
to infer that the prison population would increase under those circumstances, particularly after implementation of harsher drug laws. See also supra notes 173 –174
and accompanying text (discussing Chile’s drug laws).
181 See infra Part 5 (discussing reforms in the public defender systems of various countries).
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for criminal procedure such as the right to a trial, judicial review,
access to counsel and an impartial court.”182 There is, however, a
tendency to confuse procedural reforms with true substantive
change in the justice system. As important as procedure is to the
justice system, it is meaningless without actual substance and investment by the members of the system.183
Participants in any criminal system may “rely on doctrine to
assure themselves that the sanctions they inflict follow inevitably
from the demands of neutral, disinterested legal principles rather
than from their own choice and power.”184 Despite improved procedural guarantees, Chile’s reforms may not be providing substantive justice.185 Instead, it has created a series of formal procedures
that are observed as individuals are charged, tried, and sentenced.186 Although the judiciary and the prosecutor have emCousino, supra note 4, at 328.
Infra Part 5. An example of this phenomenon is the experience of the
United States with capital punishment over the past four decades. Since the United States Supreme Court held that the then-existing system of capital punishment
violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in 1972 in Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), states have implemented a panoply of procedural
developments —bifurcated sentencing proceedings, proportionality review, and
enhanced abilities for defendants to introduce mitigation evidence, and others—
aimed at rationalizing the decision to impose death and at creating certainty. See
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital
punishment of intellectually disabled persons). The Court has reduced the number of individuals eligible for the death penalty, but some of the same overrepresentation issues remain. See also Jordan Steiker & Carol Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 358 (1995) (explaining that the Furman decision, along
with other decisions, spawned an “overly complex, absurdly arcane, and minutely
detailed body of constitutional law”). But see id. at 358–59 (noting that some critics
believe that the additional procedure has done nothing to remedy disparate
overrepresentation on death row and that the “Court has done no more than
‘tinker with the machinery of death’” (quoting Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))). Despite these enhanced protections,
many believe that the current system continues to produce unjust, racially disparate, and irrational outcomes.
184 Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 384–85 (1983).
185 Chile does have certain failings, including problems with eyewitness identification procedures and a lack of protocols for dealing with false confessions. See
Véliz, supra note 45, at 1371 (2012) (noting the key issues that lead to wrongful
convictions). These are mainly implicated in dealings with police officers, but
Véliz reports “problems with the relationship between prosecutors and police,”
specifically that prosecutors will report to the judge that the police complied with
the law even if their conduct violated the law. Id.
186 See Riego, supra note 4, at 351 (discussing the implementation of new pro182
183

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/2

2017]

PUBLIC DEFENDER AS INTERNATIONAL TRANSPLANT

875

braced their roles in the system, the residual passivity and deference of defense attorneys have created a system in which, although
the letter of the law is followed, the spirit is a secondary consideration.187 True judicial reform requires more than a procedural
framework and cannot occur until new principles and cultural
norms are well-established.188 In his discussion of the Chilean reforms, Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino noted that Cristian Riego believed that the “high standards for defendant’s rights introduced with the Reform should diminish the system’s effectiveness
on sending people to jail.”189 Cousino, however, believed that
“[t]he tensions between the two driving sources of the Reform, efficiency and protection, will clash and the outcome is likely to be
an increased rate of incarceration.”190 Based on the increase in incarceration, Cousino’s hypothesis appears to be correct.
The new system could theoretically operate more effectively
both in reducing the number of people in jail and ensuring a swift
process if defense attorneys could embrace the adversarial challenge head-on and engage in greater investigation and more energetic and zealous advocacy.191 Enthusiasm alone, however, is insufficient. Although the United States has a number of active,
energetic, and committed public defenders and indigent defense
organizations, it also has the highest prison population rate in the
world.192 United States public defender organizations are chronicedures in regards to case management). Riego explains that the new procedures
for case management have:
“[a]llowed a large number of cases to be absorbed in the system, produced significant decreases in case duration and, in general, made
Chile’s criminal justice system appear to be effective in terms of its ability
to complete the procedures provided for by law for an enormous volume
of cases and in turn producing decisions for each of them.”
Id.
187 Véliz, supra note 45, at 1366 (“A justice system may be theoretically perfect
and fail to provide its benefits to society due to the failings of those charged with
performing the primary functions the justice system entails.”).
188 See Jonathan L. Hafetz, supra note 33, at 1770–71 (indicating that “Judicial
reform may prove more political and cultural than technical in nature . . .
[M]odernization of the judiciary [in the case of Peruvian reforms] will not bring
about meaningful reform in pretrial detension and other areas unless the underlying principle of judicial independence is firmly established”).
189 Cousino, supra note 4, at 346.
190 Id.
191 See supra Part 4.1–2 and accompanying text (discussing the defenders’ lack
of a clear mission).
192 See Roy Walmsley, WORLD PRISON POPULATION. LIST 1 (2013) (reporting the
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cally underfunded, and defenders are overworked and underpaid.193 By contrast, the Chilean public defense system has access
to funding that goes unused and is seen as a valuable government
job by aspirants.194 Although an increase in investigation may create some delays for adjudication, this could lead to better outcomes
for defendants and potentially reduce incarceration. For Chile’s reforms to be truly effective, its defenders must embrace their new
roles and use available resources to develop knowledge, skills, and
attitudes that are commensurate with the responsibilities that they
are expected to handle in the new adversarial system.
4.4 Motivation and Idealism among Public Defenders
Any effective indigent defense organization must grapple with
the issue of motivation.195 The decades-long experiment with public defenders in the United States has shown that inadequate funding alone is not the reason for a generally ineffective system.196 The
role of “defender” in a truly adversarial system requires an intrinsic motivation that is more a product of culture than of legislation.
Absent a strong culture of zealous representation, evidence suggests that individual defenders and defender organizations are unable to sustain a truly adversarial stance. Defense lawyers tend to
adapt to the system within which they operate or else give up alto-

United States rate of incarceration as 716 per 100,000 inhabitants).
193 See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text (discussing the “burnout”
phenomenon among public defenders).
194 See supra Part 4.3 (stating that although the motivation appears to be financial, nurturing a culture of defender idealism may inspire more students to
seek these positions and engage more fully with the issues).
195 See Charles Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1240, 1240–41 (1993) (discussing the difficulty
many public defenders face in maintaining enthusiasm and motivation); see generally Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation
for Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161 (2009) (indicating that a change in cultural values
must occur in order to provide satisfactory defense for indigent clients); Jonathan
A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using Organizational Culture to Reform
Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177 (2008) (arguing that cultural factors play
a large role in the inadequacy of representation of indigent defendants).
196 See generally Rapping, Shaky Ground, supra note 195; Rapping, Directing the
Winds of Change, supra note 195 (providing an overview of why the public defender system in the United States is generally ineffective).
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gether.197
Those familiar with the Chilean system agree: motivation is a
consistent problem for defenders. Georgy Schubert, former national head of the Chilean public defender system, described problems that public defenders experience in remaining motivated every day, due to the stresses inherent in the job. Schubert said that
some well-meaning lawyers eventually conclude that the effort is
just not worth the result.198 Schubert argued, however, that everyone in the justice system has a responsibility to change that attitude
and to encourage the work of public defenders actually playing an
adversarial role within the system.199
Problems of social stigma and motivation among public defenders are global and intractable. A study of public defenders in
Venezuela in 1993 could unfortunately have been written today
about the problems facing public defenders in many parts of the
United States and other countries. The Venezuelan public defenders in the study “sense a great social distance between themselves
and their clients, view them as guilty and clearly are not disposed
to make any effort to defend them.”200 The attitude of the lawyers
described above has a predictable counterpart in the attitude of
their clients:
Contact between defendants and public defenders is so superficial that many interviewed prisoners ignore the fact
that they have public counsel and when asked about the
role of the public defender at court hearings where the
presence of counsel is required, the prisoners make no distinction among the roles [of the judge and public defender];
rather, all of the judicial functionaries are viewed together
as ‘those who want to screw’ [the prisoners.]201
Similar descriptions of the difficulties facing public defenders
197 See Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and
Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203,
1206–07 (2004) (analyzing the reasons behind public defenders’ decisions to “defect” to another field); see generally AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA
HOLDS COURT (2009) (examining everyday courtroom failures).
198 Interview with Georgy Schubert, former national head of the Chilean public defender system (Oct. 27, 2014).
199 Id.
200 See Sutil, supra note 11, at 283 n.20 (quoting Rafael Pérez Perdomo, Informe
sobre Venezuela, in SITUACIÓN Y POLÍTICAS JUDICIALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA,
CUADERNOS DE ANÁLISIS JURÍDICO 588 (Jorge Correa Sutil, ed., 1993)).
201 Id.
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abound, both in the U.S. context and in Latin America.202
Those lawyers who become public defenders for idealistic reasons in Chile tend to describe their motivations in the language of
human rights.203 Perez described one of the primary motivations
for idealistic new public defenders as protection of their clients’
human rights.204 According to Schubert, the source of inspiration is
more a sense of human rights, and he believes that this is true all
over Latin America.205 The ideals of dignity and equality animate
people to do this kind of work. “The inspiration is that if the new
system respects the rights of this defendant, then we are strengthening society.”206 One can expect, however, that as the era of dictatorship and gross human rights violations in Chile and throughout
Latin America recedes further into history, a motivation based entirely on maintenance of human rights norms will lose its salience
and immediacy, and new motivations for public defenders will be
needed.
Leonardo Moreno agrees with this characterization. He thinks
that the type of person who chooses a career in criminal defense in
Chile has already changed significantly in the years since the passage of the reforms.207 Moreno explained that immediately after
the creation of the DPP and other reforms, everyone who was
hired or began to do this work had a natural propensity for criminal defense.208 Today, it has become more of a civil service job for
many, without any deeper desire or internal motivation to engage
in criminal defense work.209 Moreno said that he believes that
there are now two distinct classes of lawyers who do criminal defense in Chile: those who are committed for reasons of idealism,
and those who are drawn to the steady paycheck and job securi202

Id. at 283 n. 18–20:

“Almost invariably, the quality of the legal representation provided by
these government lawyers is very low—the office of the public defender
is likely to be understaffed and overburdened and the nature of the public defender’s function or service is often negatively perceived by both
the public defender and the person whom he or she represents.”
Id.
Interview with Perez, supra note 95.
205 Interview with Schubert, supra note 198.
206 Id. (author’s translation).
207 Interview with Leonardo Moreno, Professor, Alberto Hurtado University
in Santiago, Chile (Oct. 27, 2014), supra note 139.
208 Id.
209 Id.
203
204
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ty.210
But as the system continues the transition from an inquisitorial
to an adversarial system, different challenges, stresses, and motivations will confront the people who seek to occupy the role of the
public defender. As the focus of adjudication becomes public, oral,
and lawyer-centered, the day-to-day job of the public defender becomes more stressful. And as the ethical model more wholly embraces a zealous defense committed exclusively to the wishes of the
client (as opposed to the interests of the state in an inquisitorial
model), public defenders in Chile and other newly adversarial systems will likely face the social stigma and potential burnout that
has accompanied other adversarial defenders. The defense lawyer
in an adversarial system has greater moral leeway than a lawyer in
any other context, which can lead to a more stressful and more
stigmatized professional life. The defense lawyer has been called
an “amoral technician”211 whose work, although unquestionably
justified, can lead to moral unease.212 Almost a half-century ago, in
United States v. Wade,213 Justice White articulated the proper role of
a defense attorney in an adversarial system:
[D]efense counsel has no . . . obligation to ascertain or present the truth. . . . If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or
indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our interest in
not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State
to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible
light, regardless of what he thinks or know to be the
truth.214
Although few today would question the ethical appropriateness of such conduct by a defense attorney, there has been far less
examination into the moral dissonance that a public defender
might experience while undertaking such activities in the course of
representing a client, and how this phenomenon contributes to
rates of burnout among young public defenders.
The related issues of justification, motivation, and inspiration
210
211

6).

Id.
Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1248 (quoting Wasserstrom, supra note 16, at

212 See id. at 1249 (discussing ethical and moral issues that plague public defenders).
213 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
214 Id. at 256–58.
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of public defenders have been topics of scholarship in the United
States for at least two decades.215 Newly adversarial systems can
expect to encounter many of the same problems as their systems
mature into adolescence and beyond. By examining the problems
encountered in the United States and proposals for reform, Chile
and other such countries may be able to address these problems
early and incorporate some of the successful ideas into the training
and culture of public defender offices.
Charles Ogletree pointed out the vacuum in legal literature on
motivations for those involved in indigent criminal defense. In an
adversarial system, virtually everybody agrees on the moral justification and the practical need for vigorous and competent criminal
defense lawyering. This focus on justification, Ogletree explains,
ignores the more important and vital question of motivation. The
theoretical justifications for criminal defense lawyering in an adversarial system are by now well-settled, but these justifications
“are insufficient to ensure that people will become and remain
public defenders”216 and to engage in the zealous lawyering that an
adversarial system demands.
Examining the indigent defense systems in the United States,
Ogletree describes the troubling phenomenon of “burnout” among
public defenders and attributes the cause, at least in part, to the
failure of legal scholars “to develop sufficient motivations for lawyers to engage in criminal defense—particularly defense of the indigent.”217 As he deploys the term, “burnout” refers both to public
215 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Inventing the Public Defender, 43 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1267 (2006) (describing the history of the public defender); Bennett H.
Brummer, The Banality of Excessive Defender Workload: Managing the Systemic Obstruction of Justice, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 104 (2009) (explaining the impact of the
public defender’s excessive caseload); Ogletree, supra note 195 (examining the
problem of burnout amongst public defenders); Sadiq Reza, Religion and the Public
Defender, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (1999) (discussing the role of religion in relation to public defender motivation and conduct); Rodney Thaxton, Professionalism
and Life in the Trenches: The Case of the Public Defender, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 185,
185–86 (1995) (noting the perception that public defenders are not “real lawyers”).
216 Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1294. Ogleetree adds:

Even if she agrees (as nearly all public defenders do) that vigorous defense of the guilty is morally justified in our adversary system, that lawyer may not zealously represent a criminal defendant absent a sufficiently compelling motivation— an impetus to do the work, rather than a
theory that merely argues that it is defensible, excusable, or laudable for
someone to do that work.
Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1242.
217 Id.
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defenders moving on to other areas of practice which might be
more lucrative and less stressful and to public defenders remaining
on the job but providing underzealous representation for their clients. In this context, Ogletree defines “burnout” as “the failure of
one’s moral justification for undertaking indigent defense work to
provide a day-to-day motivation for getting up each morning, putting on a suit, and going to the office or to court.”218
Ogletree distinguishes between a justification as “a morally or
legally acceptable reason for taking action” whereas a motivation
“persuades a particular person to take a certain action.”219 A justification answers the question “why should it be done?” and a motivation answers the question “why should I do it?”220 A misplaced continued focus on developing justifications for zealous
criminal defense has led to a failure to address the more pressing
question of motivation and contributed to the current crisis in indigent criminal defense in the United States.
In an effort to redirect the scholarly focus from justifications to
motivations, Ogletree offers the dual motivations of empathy and
heroism. He defines empathy as “understanding the experiences,
behavior and feelings of others as they experience them.”221 Empathy in action for Ogletree meant treating his clients as friends; because of this bond, he felt greater motivation to communicate with
his clients and assist them—even clients accused of committing terrible acts.222 When an attorney builds a caring and empathetic relationship with a client “not only does she want to assist him
through the complex maze of our legal system, but she also wants
him to succeed; as a result, her defense is zealous.”223 Ogletree argues that empathy transforms attorneys into good attorneys and
resolves the problem of burnout.224 The other motivation, heroism,
taps into an individual’s competitive nature. Some public defenders find “glory in the ‘David versus Goliath’ challenge of fighting
the state and the battle of wits that characterizes the courtroom
Id. at 1267–68.
Id. at 1244. Barbara Allen Babcock describes one justification as “The Garbage Collector’s Reason.” Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 175, 177 (1983). To put it simply, “it is dirty work, but someone must
do it.”
220 Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1244.
221 Id. at 1271–72.
222 Id. at 1272–73.
223 Id. at 1274.
224 See id. at 1274–75 (listing ways in which empathy enhances attorney skill).
218
219
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drama. ”225 Heroism allows an attorney to “argue more forcefully
and persuasively.”226 It motivates an attorney because he feels
needed and understands that his client relies on him.227
In a response to Ogletree, Abbe Smith examines some stated
motivations for public defenders and discusses those that tend to
sustain over time and, by contrast, those that either fail to sustain
or in fact prove to be counter-productive.228 Smith takes as her
starting point Ogletree’s paradigm of heroism and empathy as motivating values for modern public defenders and critiques it as unrealistic and perhaps even counter-productive in that it asks too
much of public defenders and thus hastens feelings of burnout and
shortens the amount of time that good lawyers will remain public
defenders.229 Empathy and heroism may not be strong enough motivation to counter the stress and stigma attached to being a defense attorney in an adversarial system.230 Public defenders face
long hours and low wages. Public defenders lose often and may
feel overwhelmed and at a disadvantage when comparing the resources available to prosecutors.231 The adversarial system functions best when both parties are equally prepared, something that
may be nearly impossible for public defenders, regardless of personal diligence or motivation.232 It is easy to lose heart in the face
of those odds. By contrast, defenders in the inquisitorial system
may not experience the same stresses. The length of time required
for inquisitorial matters means that defenders in that system may
not be as overworked. Their role is often formal and does not embrace the model of zealous advocacy that can be as exhausting for
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1277.
227 Id.
228 Smith, supra note 197, at 1208–18 (discussing various motivations for public defenders).
229 See id. at 1238 (theorizing that the Ogletree model is primarily aimed at
encouraging young lawyers to do defense work for short periods of time, rather
than building a career in the field).
230 See Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50
MERCER L. REV. 443, 451 (1999) [hereinafter Smith and Montross, Calling] (“[O]n
the whole, criminal defense lawyers are [regarded as] dishonorable or disreputable, immoral or amoral, manipulative or heartless.”).
231 See Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1240–41 (discussing problems generally
faced by public defenders).
232 Supra Part 2 (discussing the theories behind the adversarial system); see
also Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1276 (explaining that some lawyers become public
defenders because they understand the disadvantages defendants face and want
to balance the scales by representing the underdog).
225
226
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the attorney as it is beneficial to the client.
Smith first takes a look at the “classic motivations” that are given by public defenders, foremost among then a focus on civil libertarianism. An exclusive philosophical focus on civil liberties or
rights comes up wanting as a means to sustain public defenders
through the difficulties of their work.233 Concluding that “constitutional ideals alone are insufficient to sustain a career in criminal
defense,”234 Smith quotes a former public defender who quit after
four years to become a prosecutor: “I am at a point right now
where I need more than a philosophical construct, even one as noble as the Sixth Amendment. I want direct . . . evidence that I am
doing good, that I am doing justice.”235 Of those public defenders
in Chile who express their motivations in terms of idealism, most
express them in terms close to these, or in terms of norms of international human rights. Either way, the reliance on a philosophical
construct alone is likely to fall short in the manner Smith describes
in providing a long-term motivation and inspiration for a public
defender in a truly adversarial system.236
Smith then challenges Ogletree’s paradigm. Empathy, she concludes, “is often difficult to sustain in view of the volume and nature of the work”237 and ultimately blurs personal and professional
boundaries in a way that can increase the difficult and allconsuming nature of the work of the public defender.238 The extreme empathy Ogletree prescribes for each and every client that a
public defender represents greatly increases the already-heavy
burden on the defender’s shoulders and can end up shortening her
career, rather than sustaining her energy.239 Heroism proves to be
an unsatisfying motivation for Smith, as its extreme focus of “win-

233 See Smith, supra note 197, at 1211 (“Inevitably, idealism (seeing things as
they should be rather than as they are) comes up against bitter contrasting reality
(admitting ‘the noble purpose of our criminal courts . . . has gone awry’), causing
disillusionment.”).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 1210–11 & n.26.
236 Smith does not completely discount idealism as motivation, noting that
“[b]elieving that the fight itself makes a difference, whether or not one prevails in
the end, is both powerful and essential for defenders.” Id. at 1211.
237 Id. at 1222.
238 Id. at 1220–24.
239 Id. at 1227 (“If Professor Ogletree was ‘devastated’ by the conviction of a
client who was not terribly sympathetic and was likely guilty—how much more
devastation could he withstand?”).
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ning against all odds” provides a lift that is “fleeting at best”240 and
limited in the broader context of an economic and criminal justice
system that so wholly disempowers and devalues the lives of those
who are the subjects of the criminal justice system.241
In place of heroism and empathy, Smith proposes a three-part
paradigm of motivations: respect for one’s client, pride in the professional craft of criminal defense, and a sense of outrage at the injustices of the system.242 Respect “embrac[es] the client’s dignity,
autonomy, and humanity.”243 Smith argues that the attorney’s role
is as an advocate, not a friend.244 Maintaining appropriate boundaries while respecting the client’s choices as an independent person
increases a lawyer’s efficacy and career longevity.245
Craft, as defined by Smith, is much broader than trial skills and
courtroom advocacy; she proposes that “the craft of defending can
be summarized as the ability to work with sometimes difficult
people and get them to make better decisions than they would otherwise make.”246 Taking pride in one’s professional craft—in a “job
well done” is important to defenders because they often lose.247
Smith concludes that “[a] central part of the craft of defending is
pushing the criminal justice system to step up. Defenders are the
‘institutional opposition.’”248 Finally, Smith sees outrage as a motivation and an inspiration to action.249 She explains that clients face
hopeless circumstances and overwhelming odds. “Outrage motivates [defenders] time and time again to put [themselves] between
[their] clients and the threat of loss of liberty.”250
More than a half-century after Gideon v. Wainwright,251 scholars
and lawyers in the United States continue to struggle with not only
the formal but also the cultural aspects of indigent defense lawyering. Other countries that have moved recently toward an adverId.at 1234–35.
Id. at 1237–38.
242 Id. at 1243–64.
243 Id. at 1244.
244 Id. at 1246.
245 Id. at 1250.
246 Id. at 1256. Smith includes “clients, prosecutors, court staff, and judges” in
her category of “sometimes difficult people.” Id.
247 Id. at 1252.
248 Id. at 1255.
249 Id. at 1259–60.
250 Id. at 1263.
251 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
240
241
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sarial system have done so for reasons distinct from the United
States and within very different historical contexts. The cultural
motivations that might make sense in the United States context
might have very little resonance in a system as different as that in
Chile or other Latin American countries. My argument is not that
Chile should adopt a model of public defender culture embracing
heroism and empathy; nor one focused on craft, professionalism,
and outrage; nor another model entirely. But what has not yet
happened in Chile and other countries with a newly adversarial
criminal justice system is the engagement with these broad questions: What do we want our public defenders to do? By what do
we want them to be motivated? And how will we know when
they are succeeding? The conversation that has developed in the
United States over the past couple of decades has provided a starting point for this conversation, a conversation that remains unsettled and active in the United States. But the motivations that
served for defense lawyers in an inquisitorial system are entirely
insufficient and ill-suited for those working within an adversarial
system. For Chile to define the role of the public defender, it needs
to engage these questions openly and broadly.
5.

SECOND-GENERATION REFORMS FOR THE DEFENSE LAWYER IN A
NEWLY ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

Many adversarial systems pay lip service to the ideal of an active, zealous, and adversarial public defender as essential to the
process while not providing either the resources or the legal culture to allow for the realization of such an ideal.252 Every system
252 See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an
Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 60 (1991) (“A criminal justice system
may theoretically survive by creating the perception of adherence to fair process
norms. However, in an adversary system, where Sixth Amendment rights are at
the fulcrum of the process, mere ‘perception’ is not sufficient.”); Bruce A. Green,
Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV.
433, 513 (1993) (arguing that the current system of providing defense attorneys is
hampered by the idea that “lawyers are qualified to do anything” regardless of
individual attorney competency in criminal matters); Richard Klein, The Emperor
Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 627 (1986) (arguing that underfunding of defense agencies threatens the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth, and Symbol
in the Adversarial Criminal Process—A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a
Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 802 (1995) (“[v]irtually every public
defender office in the country is vastly underfunded.”).
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embodies some disconnect between the rhetoric of the system and
the reality of practice. While the formal structures of an adversarial system can appear to be set up to favor the rights of the individual accused over the interests of the state, the reality is often quite
different. The passive, acquiescent, and ineffective public defender
in any system can function as a fig leaf, masking and legitimizing
the injustice of the system as it truly functions.253 At the time of the
reforms, some Chilean academics were aware of this phenomenon
in the United States criminal justice system and concerned about
replicating a system in which the defense lawyer is relatively powerless compared to the prosecutor. Under these circumstances, the
resulting process is not a battle between two equal adversaries, as
the rhetoric of the system would have it appear.254
One observer believed that Chile’s inquisitorial tradition might
be harnessed to serve the objectives of the new adversarialism:
The greatest challenge in reconstructing the public defenders will be to set up the minimum conditions to bring the
rhetorical advances to reality. Here, the inquisitorial tradition may play an important role if managed in the correct
direction. The active inquisitorial judges should readjust
their capacity in order to be the guardians of the minimum
standards for defense at trial.255
Such prescriptions were correctly grounded in observations of
the United States’ experience with public defenders. Although
some are quite successful in providing the meaningful check on
253 Public defenders willing to take risks may be able to achieve significant
change given their importance in the justice system. Abbe Smith relates one anecdote describing an effective defender response to injustice. After significant
budget cuts, the Jefferson County Public Defender’s office stopped representing
indigent people in involuntary commitment proceedings. “The result was the release of four involuntarily committed former clients and an order by the Chief Jefferson District Judge that the official in charge of the state budget either restore
the public defenders’ funds or be held in contempt.” Smith, supra note 197, at
1257 n.296.
254 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 349:

[T]he unequal social distribution: the power to define the crimes; the biased and oversimplified media coverage of the criminal issue; the selective police enforcement; limited access to counsel among poor people;
and the extensive prosecutorial advantages in the investigative tools and
resources. All these factors, in one way or another, favors the prosecutor.
255 Id. at 350. The emphasis on the judiciary as the guardians of “minimum
standards” suggests that someone anticipated that public defenders culture might
remain grounded in a passive, inquisitorial mode.
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state power that the system articulates as its objective, the reality in
most jurisdictions is a system in which public defenders are in a
“diminished position”256 relative to the prosecution, meaning they
suffer from resource problems and a lack of qualified or sufficiently trained lawyers to make the rhetoric of the right to counsel a reality.
Aside from the well-documented financial challenges of public
defenders in the United States, Chilean academics and reformers
were aware of non-financial challenges that could best be described as cultural. While the reforms were being debated prior to
their implementation, Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino noted
the “hostile environment” that public defenders in the United
States face due to the public’s perception of their role within the
system.257 Cousino described the difficulties that U.S. public defenders face in establishing productive relationships with their clients due to heavy caseloads, and describes the job as placing a
“heavy psychological burden” on those who do it.258 As a result,
Cousino writes, many public defenders either leave that job or
“develop a disillusioned and cynical approach about themselves.”259 Taking the United States experience as a cautionary tale,
Cousino argues that Chile must create a public defender equal to
the prosecutor “not only at the rhetorical level but also at implementation,” which would mean “a central institutional office, with
a high prestige profile similar to the prosecutors.”260
256 See Id. at 350–51 (discussing challenges U.S. public defenders face and the
consequences of these challenges).
257 Id. at 351 (“The public’s perception about their role creates a hostile environment against their function. As stated by Ogletree, ‘public defenders are criticized at least as much for doing their job well as for doing it poorly.’” (quoting
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 87 (1995)).
258 Id. (explaining that “complexities and limitations that public defenders
face inside and outside the trial place a heavy psychological burden on the individuals . . . . [t]hese aspects must be considered when reconstructing the public
defenders since the magnitude of this task under the adversarial premises is as
important as the prosecutor’s case.”).
259 Id. (citing Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the
21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 81, 87–89 (1995)).
260 Id. One of the criticisms of the Chilean reforms is that the DPP lacks
equivalent constitutional status with the prosecutorial and judicial branches. Interview with Claudio Perez, supra note 95 (stating that “concretely” they have not
had any problems due to this lack of symmetrical authority, but that it could conceivably become a problem under future administrations. So far, though, the DPP
has not had any problems with its budget and he has seen no difference in treatment of the DPP by the various national governments that have been in power
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In recent years, scholars and leaders in the defense bar in the
United States have increasingly focused on culture as a critical element to any successful public defender system. Robin Steinberg,
the founder and executive director of Bronx Defenders, noted in
2004 that “[p]ublic defenders everywhere are starting to reassess
the most fundamental questions of what it means to provide effective representation for their clients.”261 Steinberg compares the culture of a “traditional defender” office to that of a “client-centered
defender” office, and demonstrates both the advantages of the client-centered model and the crucial need to transform the culture of
criminal defense practice to achieve a client-centered, communitybased, and holistic approach.262
A focus on trial skills and courtroom advocacy has been central
to traditional public defender offices, and excellence inside of the
courtroom has generally been considered the hallmark of an effective defense lawyer. While acknowledging the importance of
courtroom results for those charged with crimes, Steinberg calls for
leaders of public defender offices to broaden their ideas of what effective public defenders do and, indeed, what it means to be a public defender.263 She argues for full integration of investigators and
social workers into the work of the lawyers in the office and celebration of successes outside of the courtroom as much as the acquittals inside of the courtroom.264
The modern vision of the public defender office embraces interdisciplinary work, a broad understanding of what legal representation means, a client-centered approach to legal advocacy, and
a component of community outreach.265 Because this represents a
profound cultural shift in the work and vision of a public defender,
since the implementation of the reforms).
261 Robin Steinberg and David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the
Public Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 123 (2004).
262 See Id. at 123–25 (comparing the “traditional” defender office with a “client-centered” and “community-based” model and concluding that a client-centric
office leaves advocates “better equipped to simultaneously engender compassion
from judges and acquittals from juries”).
263 See Id. at 124 (explaining that a holistic approach helps professionals more
efficiently and effectively assess and meet client needs).
264 See Id. at 128–29 (providing as an example a typical office email from the
Bronx Defenders celebrating the informal advocacy of a team that convinced the
local Board of Education to pay for a residential treatment program for a client
who had earlier pleaded guilty).
265 See Id. at 125–28 (describing implementation strategies for creating community-centered public defender offices).
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it is critical that leaders of public defender offices are purposeful
and deliberate in effecting this cultural change. Steinberg notes
that it is “of paramount importance to commit time and resources
to creating this vision at the top,”266 and that the leaders of the institution must “address the fundamental questions of what the office should be, what it should do for clients, and what it should become . . .”267
During the transition from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system, Chilean reformers devoted much energy to training
lawyers and judges in the new legal structures and trial procedures. Specific training programs, many sponsored by U.S. law
schools and other organizations, focused on oral advocacy and adversarial trial skills.268 One of the main challenges with the transition to the new adversarial system was the lack of attorneys
trained to litigate in this fashion. Prosecutors in the old system had
played a very passive role and defense attorneys were entirely untrained both in an adversarial style of litigation and in investigating the cases against their clients. The system of adjudication that
existed for two centuries in Chile vested almost all power in the
judge and provided an extremely limited role for the defense counsel.269 In the years prior to the criminal justice reforms in Chile,
much of the role of the defense attorney was in fact played by recent law school graduates completing an obligatory period of postgraduate internship prior to being fully certified to practice law.270
Id.
Id.
268 Cooper, supra note 15, at 544–45 & nn. 250–51 (describing legal training
programs). Some notable examples of legal training programs are the oral advocacy training programs sponsored by Loyola Chicago Law School of Law,
McGeorge Law School, and California Western School of Law. The latter has also
played a role in “second-generation reforms,” which include evidentiary innovations such as DNA testing.
269 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 352 (“[I]t is clear that the shift from a judgeoriented model to a more adversarial one will take some prerogatives from the
judges to the prosecutors.”).
270 See Véliz, supra note 45, at 1366 (“Nor were there attorneys trained to provide legal defense for the accused, should the accused be unable to pay for an attorney, as law students completing their legal internships performed the function
of public defender.”). Prior to the reform in Chile, both civil and criminal legal
aid was provided first through the Servicio de Asistencia Judicial (SAJ) and then,
after 1981, by the Corporaciones de Asistencia Judicial (CAJ). See Garro, supra
note 200, at 283 n.24 (citing Michael A. Samway, Access to Justice: A Study of Legal
Assistance Programs for the Poor in Santiago, Chile, 6 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347,
347–49 (1996)). The system was regarded as unsuitable in meeting the needs of
the nation’s poor, with badly paid and overburdened attorneys and substandard
266
267
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Compared to the focus on training lawyers for the skills needed
and the black-letter procedural law that would govern the postreform criminal justice system, very little training focused on role
formation, professional identity, or other cultural aspects of the
new roles that lawyers would be asked to play within the new system. Of course, the focus on nuts-and-bolts training concerning,
for example, how to conduct a cross-examination and limits on judicial conduct in trial, is understandable given the profundity of
the changes that were being implemented to the adjudication system. But to have a truly adversarial system, one must accurately
and precisely define what is expected of the various roles. Now
that the structure and substance of the adversarial system are wellunderstood and ingrained in the legal culture of Chile, an important second-generation reform would be a focus on cultural aspects of the public defender. The Chilean criminal justice system
would be well-served to now devote resources to training this generation of public defenders to be active, creative, and zealous in
their representation of their clients both inside and outside of the
courtroom.
During the entire history of Chilean criminal justice prior to the
recent reforms, the roles of the prosecutor and of the defense lawyer within the system were essentially bureaucratic.271 The culture
of prosecutors may have changed organically as their new responsibilities (deciding on which charges to bring, conducting fact investigations of alleged criminal activity, presenting evidence to obtain convictions) required a more active role. Changing the
bureaucratic mindset of defense lawyers, however, cannot be done
by legislation but requires a shift in culture. Without this change
in the role of the defense lawyer, however, the logic of the adversarial system falls apart and the reformed criminal justice system
offices. Id. at 89 (explaining that “[t]he attitude of recent law graduates toward
SAJ is not one of dedication to the task of assisting the poor while perfecting professional skills.” (citing LEGAL AID AND WORLD POVERTY: A SURVEY OF ASIA, AFRICA,
AND LATIN AMERICA 89 (C. Foster Knight ed., (1974))). Although the study is from
1974, similar criticisms were consistently levelled at the CAJs until the creation of
the DPP. Also, as in prior years, the CAJs continued to rely on the services of unpaid recent law graduates (“postulantes”) until the creation of the DPP. See id. at
283 n.24; see also Michael A. Samway, Access to Justice: A Study of Legal Assistance
Programs for the Poor in Santiago, Chile, 6 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 358 (1996)
(describing the situation as “of mid-1995, [where] 234 students worked for the
Corporations for Judicial Assistance, and comprised 68 percent of those who attended to clients.”).
271 See Duce, supra note 10, at 2,21 (explaining the history of the Chilean criminal justice system).
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will provide no greater protections for the accused than the old inquisitorial system.272
Some have pointed out the need to consciously address the creation of a culture of criminal defense in the context of the Chilean
reforms, but there is little evidence that any concrete steps have
been taken in this direction. Writing before the reforms had even
been implemented, Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino pointed
out the importance of public defenders developing “a special office
culture” under the new system and argued that such issues were as
important as the formal, structural changes brought by the legislation:
Aside from the institutional setting, public defenders
should be provided with specific and comprehensive training programs to develop the required skills to investigate
and advocate in trial. At the organizational level, the public
defenders should develop a special office culture based on
the adversarial role expected under the reform. The development of this culture should create a strong identity required to overcome the disadvantages that taint the public
defender’s role in the new model. The importance in reconstructing a strong public defender to suit the expectations that the adversarial system puts on the parties may be
the most important way to secure the protection goal of reform, a goal that the adversarial system by itself seems unable to ensure.273
As in the United States or other adversarial systems, public defenders in the new Chilean system face a hostile environment both
inside and outside of the courtroom. Creation of a supportive and
mutually reinforcing culture of zealous criminal defense should be
seen as a critical component to ensuring the vitality and success of
this branch of the criminal justice system.
The change from inquisitorialism to adversarialism is far deeper than a tactical or procedural shift, but instead constitutes a new
way of producing meaning, a renegotiation of state power, and a
profound challenge to the unchecked power of the state. How,
then, do defense lawyers (and the very idea of defense lawyering)
need to evolve to play a meaningful role within the new system?
The most obvious ways involve tactical methods: defense lawyers
272
273
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must learn the trial skills necessary to succeed in the courtroom,
including public speaking and argumentation, negotiation with the
prosecutors over reduced charges or sentences, learning about alternative means for resolving criminal disputes, and confronting
the evidence put on by the government in a meaningful way.274
More deeply, the defense lawyer in a newly adversarial system
must learn to investigate cases, interview witnesses, and structure
the presentation, when appropriate, of an alternative set of facts to
challenge the theory of the government. All of these are aspects of
the more active, engaged, and pervasive role of the defense lawyer
in the adversarial system.
6. CONCLUSION
Understanding a key difference in history and tradition between the United States and Latin America aids in understanding
many of the problems in transplanting an institution like the public
defender to a Latin American context. The U.S. criminal justice
system, like its system of government generally, was founded on a
deep philosophical and historical mistrust of government.275 This
philosophical orientation, deeply rooted in the origin myth of the
United States, naturally leads to an adversarial procedural system
and an oral tradition rooted in a clear division between the goals
and loyalty of the parties. The European tradition of inquisitorialism, however, is rooted deeply in a belief and trust in the ability of
government actors to apply the law correctly and justly. In this
tradition, the various players in the criminal adjudication system
are not adversaries but teammates, working together for the right
result.276 This self-conception of the actors in the criminal justice
274 Commenting on the credibility of witnesses based on how they testify and
respond to cross-examination is something that will be new to lawyers in Chile’s
new adversarial system.
275 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (explaining that “[t]he Framers of
the Bill of Rights envisaged a broader role for counsel than under the practice then
prevailing in England . . . . ‘the colonists appreciated that if a defendant were
forced to stand alone against the state, his case was foredoomed.’” (quoting Note,
An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE
L.J. 1000, 1040–42 (1964))).
276 See Sutil, supra note 11, at 257 (explaining that “[t]he continental European
model our codifiers of the [nineteenth] century were following was not that of a
branch of government that could control the others, as in the United States, but
that of ‘inanimated figures’ who would mechanically apply the law.”).
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system as functionaries or bureaucrats (certainly a pejorative term
in the United States) has proven difficult to change as Latin American countries move to a system that is adversarial in structure. The
ideological or cultural transition has proven more resistant to
change than have the transitions in the structure and substance of
the criminal adjudication systems.
As Chile emerged from the Pinochet dictatorship and began the
process of legal reform, the country “cherry-picked the best aspects
of a variety of models in the private law field (most of which emanated from the United States)” to develop a new adversarial legal
system.277 The same happened in the area of criminal procedure as
Chile created its own unique model of hybrid adversarialism. As
Chile and other countries continue to experiment with adversarialism, they should continue this tradition and practice of borrowing
from other criminal adjudication systems, learning and adopting
what works, and abandoning what does not. Implementing reforms in the culture and training of criminal defense lawyers working within the new adversarial system is the critical next generation of reforms for Chile and other countries that have moved
away from inquisitorialism.
The main motivation behind the shift from inquisitorialism to
adversarialism is the notion that an adversarial system is more protective and respectful of individual rights. But this is only true,
and the adversarial system only works, if the accused is meaningfully represented by a competent defense lawyer properly confronting the state. If not, then the adversarial system is only a fig
leaf hiding the true injustice of the system. Furthermore, it is potentially a much more tyrannical system, because the judge has
been converted from an active to a passive participant, and the
prosecutor is much more invested and incentivized to go after the
accused, as opposed to being more of a civil servant and impartial
bureaucrat. Adversarialism without meaningful defense lawyering can be as inhumane and lead to as many injustices as the nowrejected inquisitorial systems.

277

Cooper, supra note 15, at 523.
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